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UNCONSCIONABLE QUANDARY: UCC ARTICLE 2
AND THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE
CAROL B. SWANSON*
INTRODUCTION
When the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 2-302 introduced the innovative'
unconscionability doctrine in the 1960s,2 the undefined concept 3 created a wild card
in contract law.' A blurred doctrine' designed to address extreme unfairness,"
unconscionability has been the focus of endless commentary' but has not been a
frequent basis for relief.'
Still, in a commercial world of standardized contracts9 largely unread by the
parties,'0 the unconscionability doctrine is an important variable. Courts and
commentators have construed and criticized the concept for almost forty years, and
the arguments and uncertainty continue unabated. Detractors decry
unconscionability's formless presence; supporters applaud the amorphous
doctrine's ability to supply relief when other policing defenses fail. By the end of
the 1980s, it was unclear whether-or how-Section 2-302 might be improved.

* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. A.B., Bowdoin College; J.D., Vanderbilt Law
School. The author is grateful to Allen Blair for his fine research and commends Professors Linda Rusch and Steve
Swanson for their invaluable support.
1. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs § 4.28, at 307 (3d ed. 1999) (describing unconscionability
as one of the UCC's "most innovative sections").
2. W. DAvID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISmS: THE LATE 20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OFCONTRACT LAW
57 (1996) (describing the doctrine's introduction and subsequent adoption).
3. "Nowhere among the Code's many definitions is there one for unconscionability.That the term is
incapable of precise definition is a source of both strength and weakness." FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.28, at
310. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
4. See THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS 679 (3d ed. 1999) (describing unconscionability as a "wild card doctrine"). But see Michael M.
Greenfield & Linda J. Rusch, Limits on Standard-FormContractingin Revised Article 2, 32 U.C.C. LJ. 115, 121
(1999) (saying that unconscionability is vague, but not a "wild card" because "courts can work with it, and
merchants can live with it").
5. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Contract:An Analysis of the Twentieth Century's
Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 265, 294 (1999) ("Unconscionability lies in the
borderland where lines between contract theory, doctrine, and practice are blurred.").
6. As a general matter, the doctrine is defined as "[e]xtreme unfairness" and as "[tihe principle that a court
may refuse to enforce a contract that is unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during contract formation
or because of overreaching contractual terms." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (7th ed. 1999).
7. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.28, at 307-08 (noting that scholars have "lavished more ink on
[Section 2-3021 than on any comparable passage in the Code").
8. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. Even when successful, the doctrine has not altered
business conduct. Contract provisions deemed unconscionable do not disappear from the scene since their inclusion
poses no risk. See SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 143 (unconscionability "has had no discernible effect on business
conduct").
9. Unconscionability cases invariably involve standard contract terms. See SLAWSON, supranote 2, at 142
("In the thousands of decisions concerning unconscionability the courts have handed down since the Code was
enacted, there is not one in which the terms held to be unconscionable were not standard."). A standard-form
contract is a "preprinted contract containing set clauses, used repeatedly by a business or within a particular
industry with only slight additions or modifications to meet the specific situation." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 325
(7th ed. 1999). This article will use the terms "standard," "standardized," and "standard-form" contract
interchangeaby. See infra notes 218-27 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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During the past decade, the UCC Article 2 drafting committee has been
contemplating significant revisions, including the redrafting of Section 2-302. "Just
as unconscionability itself is classically regarded as requiring substantive and
procedural components," the revisions have been problematic on both levels.
Procedurally, the drafters have endured lengthy infighting among various interest
groups, hoping ultimately to craft a product that the states will adopt uniformly.
Throughout years of drafting, the committee has lurched forward through fits and
stops, adopting and then dropping various approaches to the unconscionability
doctrine's substantive content.1 3 The options under consideration have included
expanding remedies, broadening the time frame for misconduct, and providing more
specificity regarding the relevant tests, but no substantive suggestion has satisfied
both industry and consumer factions.
In 1999, a revised approach to unconscionability stood poised for final adoption
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL),
but the politics of competing concerns brought Article 2's reading to a halt before
the final vote, deferring action for at least another year. 4 When the reconstituted
drafting committee began its task once again, 5 the unconscionability section
essentially16 reverted to its pre-revisions stance, taking Section 2-302 back to where
it started.
Thus, despite great dissatisfaction regarding the formless nature of a difficult
doctrine and years of diligent examination, no consensus has been achieved
regarding how to improve Section 2-302's substance. Ironically, unconscionability's
lack of definition is at once its best and worst feature. The concept is unloved, yet
apparently just too cherished to risk reforming. This unconscionable quandary is the
apparent future of the current Article 2 revisions process,' as well as the doctrine
itself.
This article explores unconscionability in terms of where it has been, where it is
going, and how the Article 2 revisions process has affected the concept's outlook.
It begins with a brief overview of the doctrine's controversial birth as part of Article
2 nearly forty years ago. Part I next examines unconscionability's development
11. Although Section 2-302 has been the traditional home for the unconscionability doctrine in UCC Article
2, several revised drafts have moved the concept to a new location in part 1-§ 2-105. See infra notes 155-84 and
accompanying text (describing the drafts incorporating Section 2-105).
12. See discussion infra Part 1(BXI)(a).
13. Recent revised drafts of Article 2 can be found at http:/www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm (last
modified June 7, 2001). This site is maintained by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) in association with the University of Pennsylvania.
14. Seediscussioni nfra Part ll(A)(2) (describing the events surrounding NCCUSL's 1999 annual meeting).
15. When NCCUSL chose to defer, rather than approve, the revisions, Professor Richard E. Speidel, the
drafting committee's reporter since its inception, resigned, and a newly reconstituted committee was appointed.
See Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of a Search for
Balance,52 SMU L REv. 1683, 1683 n.2 (1999) (noting that Speidel resigned on July 26, 1999); see also Press
Release, The American Law Institute (AL) and NCCUSL, AL and NCCUSL Announce New Drafting Committee
for UCC Articles 2 and 2A (Aug. 18,1999) [hereinafter AL & NCCUSLAug. 18,1999 Press Release) (describing
the reconstituted committee), available at http://www.ali.org/ali/prO8l999.htm.
16. This article reflects research through the summer of 2000. Subsequent changes have yielded a revised
unconscionability provision that even more closely resembles the original. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (Draft for Approval
at Annual Meeting ofNCCUSL Aug. 10-17,2001),available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/uccO6l2.
htm.

17. The Article 2 revisions are currently stymied for a host of reasons. See infra Part IU.
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under case law and commentary. Part II explores how the Article 2 revisions
process has addressed unconscionability, including the drafting committee's various
substantive approaches. Giving special attention to the version almost approved in
1999, the article weighs that aborted effort against the more conservative "status
quo" content of the current draft. Part Ill addresses the larger picture, concluding
that the failed revisions process may not be a failure for contract law and that the
very subtle changes in the current Section 2-302 may actually assist the natural
development of a doctrine renowned for its mysterious qualities. In short, this
unconscionable quandary may ultimately yield quite comfortable results.
I. THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE
A. In the Beginning
Two centuries before the Uniform Commercial Code made the unconscionability
doctrine available at law, the courts had woven public policy and ideas from equity
and tort into innovative principles that would save consumers from unfair

bargains."8 There was something instinctive about refusing to enforce oppressive

contractual provisions; after all, equity should not permit disproportionate hardship
in a free enterprise society.19 In oft-quoted words from the eighteenth century, an
unconscionable agreement is one "such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept

on the other."' Pre-Code cases confirm the equitable origins of unconscionability,

but are not helpful in construing the doctrine's meaning in modem times.2
Controversial from its inception, Section 2-302 presents Article 2's
unconscionability doctrine, the most significant change in contract law' 3 and

18. For a discussion of the unconscionability doctrine's historical underpinnings, see KEVIN M. TEEvEN,
A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACr 314-18 (1990); 8 SAMUEL WILLSTON &
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACrS §§ 18:1-18:2 (4th ed. 1998). The concept dates back
to Roman law and the Middle Ages. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the
Twentieth Century's Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEw ENG. L REv. 265, 288 (1999) ('The
doctrine of unconscionability has a kinship with the Roman law of laesio enormis and the Middle Ages' just price
theory.").
19. In essence, the free enterprise society contemplates fully volitional agreements between parties
possessing equivalent economic power. "The indispensable tool in the operation of a free enterprise society is
contract. The essence of contract is volition, that free exercise of will by parties who are on a relatively equal
economic footing and who are brought together in the dynamic market place by their needs and desires." JOHN
EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACrs § 96, at 481-83 (3d ed. 1990) (describing the historical
background of unconscionability in equity).
20. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406,411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen.
125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)); see also MURRAY, supra note 19, § 96, at 486 (saying that it is
"almost mandatory" for unconscionability discussions to begin with this eighteenth century quote).
21. Equity cases typically involved suits for specific performance against land vendors who resisted, arguing
that the bargain was too harsh. In contrast, most Section 2-302 cases are damages actions against buyers who object
to an arguably unfair clause in a form contract. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.28, at 310 (contending that
early equity cases are not helpful when construing the meaning of Section 2-302).
22. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERIL.O, THE LAW OF CONTRAcTs § 9-37, at 398-403 (3d ed.
1987) (describing the controversy surrounding Section 2-302's enactment); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability
in California:A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTNGS LJ. 459, 461-62 (1995) ("The incorporation
of the unconscionability doctrine into the [UCC] in Section 2-302 generated as much controversy and discussion
as any other section of the first Official Text...") (footnote omitted).
23. See SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 57 (stating that unconscionability was "[t]he most important change in
contract law" introduced by Article 2); see also Prince,supranote 22, at 468 ("Before the promulgation of Section
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"perhaps the most valuable section in the entire Code."' The section reads,
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.'
Section 2-302 recognizes an unconscionability concept that goes beyond equity,
inviting courts to police contracts openly for unfairness instead of using what
drafter Karl Llewellyn26 called "covert tools."' 2 State courts generally accepted the
doctrine almost as soon as the Code was enacted,28 codifying unconscionability to
make it applicable to many other transactions and incorporating it as a matter of
common law.29
2-302 and the beginning of its influence, courts in law were largely deemed incapable of denying enforcement
based on an absence of fairness in the exchange.").
24. See FARNswoRTH, supra note 1, § 4.28, at 307 (quoting Karl Llewellyn, I N.Y.L. Revision Commn.,
Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 121 (1954)).
25. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1999).
26. Karl Llewellyn is known as the father of the UCC. MURRAY, supra note 19, § 11, at 23 (stating that in
order to know Article 2, it is important to understand "the pre-Code work of Karl lewellyn, the principal draftsman
of Article 2 and the father of the UCC"). It is interesting that the NCCUSL and the ALl chose colorful Llewellynn
as the principal draftsman:
There is a comforting irony in the fact that the Conference and Institute not only chose Karl
Llewellyna as principal draftsman (or Chief Reporter) for the Code but succeeded in living with
him for fifteen years on terms of mutual respect and amity. Llewellyn in the 1930s had become
the symbol of the academic revolt against Langdellianism and orthodoxy. He was flamboyant
both in his personality and his prose style. He must have seemed, to most members of both
Conference and Institute, unsound. On the other hand, Llewellyn had been a devoted member
of the Conference for many years and had become the Conference's principal draftsman in
commercial law matters. He was also, beyond question, the preeminent academic authority on
sales law (which was the starting point for the Code project): a revised Sales Act without
Llewellyn's participation would have been unthinkable....
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 84 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
27. Karl N. Uewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L REv. 700, 703 (1939) (noting that "[c]overt tools are
never reliable tools"). The comments to Section 2-302 describe the section's purpose:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the
contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has been
accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and
acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant
purpose of the contract.
U.C.C. § 2*302 cmt. 1 (1999).
28. See SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 57 (noting this important transformation in the 1960s and 1970s).
Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the UCC in 1953; by 1995, every state and the District of Columbia had
enacted it. See id. at 5-6 (describing the history of UCC adoptions).
29. See MuRRAY, supra note 19, § 96, at489 (describing the doctrine's application innumerous contexts);
WILLISTON & LoRD, supra note 18, § 18:5-:6. at 22-43 (describing common law extension of Article 2 and the
unconscionability concept in state statutes, respectively); Prince, supra note 22, at 462 (noting that courts regularly
apply Section 2-302 "to resolve issues in other types of contracts"). One commentator recently described the
doctrine's broad impact as follows:
Although UCC 2-302 is not one of the general articles of the Code and so strictly speaking
governs only "transactions in goods," it has wisely been applied, either by analogy or as an
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Although the Code provides many definitions, nowhere does it define

"unconscionability." 3 Section 2-302's comments provide only general guidance, 3'

stating that the "basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
under the circumstances existing
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
32
contract.
the
of
making
the
of
time
the
at
From the very beginning, the transactional context was a controversial part of the
equation. Principal draftsman Llewellyn believed that Article 2 should treat
commercial and consumer transactions differently. 33 This occurred in Section 2-207,
which directly addresses the difficulties arising when businesses exchange nonmatching forms.' Despite its many shortcomings, Section 2-207 attempts a realistic

assessment of agreement in commercial settings.3 In contrast, the UCC's drafters

expression of a general doctrine, to many other kinds of contracts, including contracts that fall
under other articles of the Code. The Restatement Second contains a section on
unconscionability patterned after the Code's and applicable to contracts generally, and several
uniform laws contain similar provisions applicable to contracts within their purview.
FARNSWORTH,supranote I, § 4.28, at 308 (footnotes omitted); see alsoWilliams v.Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (declaring the unconscionability doctrine to be part of contract common law).
30. Many believed that such vagueness would render unconscionability completely ineffectual. See Arthur
Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485,558-59 (1967); see

also MURRAY, supra note 20, § 96, at 487 (noting that Section 2-302 is not "even a limited improvement").
31. Section 2-302 is, after all, a general clause:
All will agree that by any test § 2-302 is a general clause. Instead of "good morals" or "good
faith,".. .the standard proposed-again the only standard-is "conscience"; courts are
authorized to refuse enforcement to any contract or clause that offends it. If the draftsmen of the
U.C.C. had any particular limitations or targets in mind, no clues can be found in the Official
Comment... .It is idle to parse this [language] or seek guidance from the illustrations
(given]... .So it is only a slight exaggeration to say that § 2-302, as it appeared in the Code at
the outset had no meaning, and most of the meanings it is to have will be discovered in the
course of its application. This is a characteristic feature of general clauses....
JOHN P. DAWSON Er AL., CoNTRAcTs: CASES AND CoMMENT 693 (7th ed. 1998) (quoting John P. Dawson,
Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARv. L REV. 1041, 1042-44 (1976)).

32. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1999). Although the UCC comments are styled as "official," the state
legislatures do not enact them. Ile Code's drafters provided comments "to promote uniformity" and "to safeguard
against misconstruction." FARNSWORTH, supranote 1,§ 1.9, at 34-35 (quoting General Comment at p. ix of 1972
edition).
33. By the late 1940s, the UCC drafters were keenly aware that the courts had been fashioning special relief
for consumers on a case-by-case basis:
[These observations] were of considerable concern to the persons working on the new statute.
We are told that Karl Uewellyn not only perceived the need for a release valve to allow courts
to reach reasonable decisions in "hard" cases without doing violence to the certainty needed for
commercial law rules, but that he also was of the opinion that the statute should differentiate
between consumers and professionals. This differentiation was to be accomplished through the
so-called "merchant rules," which created a different standard in appropriate circumstances
"between merchants."
Fred H. Miller, Consumers andthe Code: The Searchfor the ProperFormula,75 WASH. U. LQ. 187, 189-90
(1997); see alsoZipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn andthe MerchantRules, 100

HARv.L.REv. 465, 503-12 (1987) (discussing Llewellyn's beliefs).
34. This much-disparaged "Battle ofthe Forms" section has been the subject of more commentary than any
other Article 2 provision. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaosof the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND.
L. REv. 1307, 1309 n.5 (1986) (providing an extensive listing of articles).
35. One business law commentator recently described Section 2-207's beneficial innovations as follows:
Section 2-207 shifts the paradigm of contract formation. Although party autonomy remains a
fundamental assumption of the law of contract formation, Section 2-207 raises the level of
sophistication by recognizing some of the realities of behavior constituting the assent process.
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did not craft a comparable provision directly dealing with the realities of assent in
consumer transactions.' For the most part, the current Code simply does not
provide much consumer-specific protection, despite Llewellyn's original
intentions.
B. Applications and Interpretations
1. The Courts Dissect Section 2-302
a. The Classic Two-Pronged Test
Relatively speaking, the cases applying unconscionability under Article 2 have
not been numerous; judges only cautiously apply the doctrine.3" Although Section
2-302 does not define unconscionability, the section's comments provide some
guidance by faulting the one-sidedness of contract clauses. 9 In practice, courts give
important weight to UCC comments, although the text sections themselves are
certainly more authoritative.'
Left to their own devices, various courts have created their own formulations for
unconscionability.4 Courts tend to emphasize the doctrine's fact-dependent
flexibility42 and may allude to the historical notion that an unconscionable

It facilitates the formation of contracts by an exchange of documents, notwithstanding the
common law mirror image rule, while simultaneously retreating from the objective theory of
mutual assent when it is not realistic for one party to view the other's apparent manifestation
of assent as assent. That is, performance by one party does not amount to assent to the terms on
the form of the other when the drafting party reasonably knows that the party has not read or
assented to those terms.

Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 120.
36. See U4.at 121 (saying that "the fiction of objective assent retains its full force" with respect to consumer
transactions).
37. Much of what Uewellyn wanted ultimately did not find its way into Section 2-302, and what little
consumer differentiation did result was very controversial. See Fred H. Miller, Realism Not Idealism-Observations
from the Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEx. L REv. 707, 726-27 (1998) (explaining why omitting consumer
differentiation was done "for good reason").
38. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.28, at 312 (describing judicial caution in applying the
unconscionability doctrine); see also Goodwin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 970 F. Supp. 1007, 1013 (M.D. Ala.
1997) (noting that unconscionability is an extraordinary remedy).
39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
40. Professor Farnsworth has described the comments' status in the following fashion:
In practice, courts have given considerable weight to the comments-more than that ordinarily
accorded an authoritative treatise or article but less than that accorded the text itself. If the
statutory provisions adopted by the legislature contradict the comments, the comments must
clearly be rejected. The more difficult problem arises where the comments make assertions as
to matters on which the text is silent, and here also courts have often rejected the comments.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 1.10, at 35 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Walker v. Am. Cynamid Co., 948 P.2d
1123, 1128 (Idaho 1997) (noting that the courts often give UCC comments "substantial weight").
41. Judicial approaches have certainly not been consistent. See CHARtLE FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:
A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 103 (1981) ("The decided cases do not invoke the doctrine of
unconscionabilityin any systematic oreven coherent way."). Nonetheless, unconscionability under Code precedent
and common law precedent generally yields the same results. See, e.g., Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d
503 (Cal. 1985) (noting-hat "[bloth [Code and common law] pathways should lead to the same result").
42. See, e.g., A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 120 (Cal. CL App. 1982) (describing
unconscionability as "a flexible doctrine designed to allow courts to directly consider numerous factors which may
adulterate the contractual process").
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understanding is one that no sane person would make.43 The description probably
used most often appears in the classic case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.:" "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."4' This language features both
substantive and procedural components-the terms must unreasonably favor one
party, and the process must eliminate meaningful choice.'

Procedural unconscionability broadly encompasses

a whole host of

circumstances surrounding contract execution. Unfair process can result from the
use of unreasonably hard-to-read print,47 incomprehensible language," or sharp
bargaining practices49 and relates to unequal bargaining power, including
negotiation skill.' Some disparity in bargaining position occurs in most
standardized contracts; thus, unequal bargaining power alone cannot constitute
unconscionability. t As a practical matter, the courts more readily overlook
procedural unfairness if the contract involves goods or services that are nonessential
or could have been acquired elsewhere.52

43. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
44. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cit. 1965). This case was the typical Section 2-302 decision; it involved adamages
action against the buyer, who objected to the unfairness ofa particular contract clause. See generally FARNSWORTH,
supra note 2, § 4.28, at 310-11 (describing what most Section 2-302 cases involve). Although in the WalkerThomas case the contract was executed before the Code's effective date, the court regarded Section 2-302 as
"persuasive authority for following the rationale of the cases from which the section is explicitly derived." WalkerThomas, 350 F.2d at 449. Since its publication, Walker-Thomas "has generally been treated as a Code case."
FARNSWORTH, supra note 1,§ 4.28, at 311 n.26.
45. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 449. Tis quote is one of the "more popular" expressions of
unconscionability. MURRAY, supra note 20, § 96, at 490.
46. Professor Arthur Leff first made the distinction between the two components. See Leff, supra note 30,
at 487 (describing the procedural/substantive dichotomy); see also Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality,
Contract, and Unconscionability,35 WM. & MARY L REv. 445, 489 (1994) ("As every first year law student
knows, a consideration of unconscionability begins with Arthur Leff s analysis."). The line between procedural and
substantive unconscionability is often blurred. See MURRAY, supra note 19, § 96, at 490-91 (describing the
confusing distinctions).
47. See, e.g., John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569,1571 (D. Kan. 1986) (indicating that
the lease terms were "in very light-colored, fine print" that was difficult to see).
48. See MURRAY, supra note 19, § 96, at 496-97.
49. Id.
50. Bargaining power often implicates bargaining skill. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. N. Utilities, 673
F.2d 323, 330 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding that the circumstances were not unconscionable since "experienced
negotiators for both parties entered into an agreement"). In essence, procedural unconscionability may take two
forms-oppression and unfair surprise. Courts have also described these categories as involving "lack of
voluntariness" and "lack of knowledge," respectively. See Prince, supra note 22, at 474 (discussing how courts and
commentators have construed procedural unconscionability). Relief for unfair surprise is not terribly controversial
and has antecedents in other policing doctrines such as duress, misrepresentation, and mistake. Addressing
oppression, on the other hand, is more problematic and conceptually more difficult to apply. See John A. Spanogle,
Analyzing UnconscionabilityProblems, 117 U. PA. L.REv. 931,944 (1969) (noting that unfair surprise is easier
to visualize than oppression).
51. The comments to Section 2-302 provide that the underlying principle is not to disturb the "allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power." U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1999); see also Hydraform Prod. Corp. v.
Am. Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1985) (quoting Comment 1 and noting that unconscionability
turns on whether the bargaining power is so disparate that the weaker party lacks genuine choice). When the weaker
party lacks meaningful choice, the agreement may be called an "adhesion contract."
52. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.28, at 313 (stating that a "court will often buttress its
[unconscionability] conclusion.. .by stressing that the goods or services were not essential or could have been
procured elsewhere").
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Substantive unconscionability, on the.other hand, is somewhat harder to define.
Unlike procedural unconscionability, the substantive component has no elements
or factors; instead, the focus is simply on contract terms that unreasonably favor one
party.53 In some respects, it is like Justice Stewart's view of pornography-you
know it when you see it.54
On occasion, courts have made creative attempts to give the two-pronged
unconscionability doctrine more meaningful content. One approach has been to
discuss the weaker party's reasonable expectations as an adjunct to the
unconscionability analysis.55 Another view has been the adoption of multi-factored
analyses. In Wille v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,56 for example, the Kansas
court's 1976 decision enumerated ten factors to consider when applying the
concept.5 7 Ten years later, two cases went beyond the two-pronged substantive and
procedural approach to list seven considerations.58 By simply reiterating factors
commonly found throughout unconscionability case authority, these "blunderbuss
efforts" were not successful.5 9
Although UCC § 2-302 has remained relatively stagnant, having never been
significantly amended, the courts have made some important inroads in the
subsequent years. 6 Since the Walker-Thomas decision in 1965, judicial definitions
of unconscionability have remained largely the same, but the courts have
strengthened the doctrine in at least two respects. First, the courts have expanded
53. See, e.g., Garrett v. Janiewski, 480 So. 2d 1324, 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("Substantive
unconscionability requires proving that the terms of the contract are unreasonable and unfair.").
54. With respect to pornography, Justice Stewart said that he could not intelligibly define what materials
were illegal, "[b]ut I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). Contract law
commentators have drawn the comparison between that statement and the nebulous unconscionability doctrine.
See, e.g., Darren Bush, Caught Between Scylla and Charybdis: Law & Economics as a Useful Toolfor Feminist
Legal Theorists, 7 AM. UJ. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L 395, 405 (1998/99) (quoting Jacobellis and noting the
comparison); Anthony Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28
CONN. L. REv. 1, 38 (1995) (comparing unconscionability and obscenity in terms of definitional difficulties).
55. See, e.g., San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 462,464 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985) (stating that adhesion contracts are enforceable unless unconscionable or outside the weaker party's
reasonable expectations).
56. 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976).
57. The ten factors were (1) the use of printed forms involving adhesive provisions; (2) excessive price or
cost-price disparity; (3) consumer denied basic rights and remedies; (4) penalty clause(s) included; (5)
circumstances surrounding contract formation; (6) inconspicuous clauses; (7) clauses not understandable; (8)
overall balance of rights and obligations; (9) exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated, uneducated and
illiterate; and (10) unequal bargaining power. Id. at 906-07.
58. Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845,850 (10th Cir. 1986) (defineating the following seven
elements: (1) a standardized contract executed by parties of unequal bargaining power; (2) no opportunity to read
before signing; (3) use of fine print for the disputed provision; (4) no evidence that the disputed provision was
commercially reasonable or reasonably anticipated; (5) whether terms are substantively unfair; (6) the parties'
relationship, including factors of assent, unfair surprise, and notice; and (7) all circumstances surrounding contract
formation); Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 991 (Colo. 1986) (listing the same seven considerations).
59. See MURRAY, supra note 19, § 96, at 492 (criticizing the Muhan and Wille decisions as "blunderbuss
efforts" that did not enhance the available unconscionability definitions).
60. Professor Slawson described these "monumental achievements" as follows:
[The courts] have broadly interpreted Article 2 in an effort to make it good law; but for these
efforts, the article would need amending even more urgently. Although the pace of some of the
reforms has been slower since the middle 1980s, we can attribute most of the slowing to the
reforms having been largely accomplished. Moreover, the slowing has only been relative to the
extraordinarily fast pace of reform that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s.
SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 159.

Spring 2001 ]

UNCONSCIONABLE QUANDRY

the classic two-pronged test to permit relief based on one prong alone; second, they
have allowed merchants to more frequently enjoy the doctrine's protections.
b. One Prong Alone
It has been unclear to what extent courts will grant relief based on procedural or
substantive unconscionability alone.6 Although many courts say that both types of
unconscionability must be shown to invalidate a contract clause,62 decisions
increasingly reflect a sliding scale that more readily takes into account the two
elements without necessarily requiring both.63 If the process or substance alone is
sufficiently unfair, theoretically, relief will follow."
Despite this theory, courts generally resist finding procedural unconscionability
unless substantive unfairness is also present.65 Even if there is no possibility of
negotiation-as when the weaker party must accept or reject an adhesion contract'
-that circumstance alone does not compel a finding of unconscionability. Indeed,
standard-form contracts promote undeniable efficiencies, and public policy
accordingly supports their enforcement.67 If the procedural element is seriously
61. See MURRAY, supranote 19, §96(2)(b), at 491 ("There is also a lack of clarity as to whether one form
of unconscionability (procedural or substantive) is sufficient without the other.").
62. See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that Pennsylvania
law requires a two-fold determination for unconscionability); The Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d
308, 322-23 (6th Cir. 1998) (saying that Michigan law requires both components); lwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977
P.2d 989, 995 (Mont. 1999) ("Unconscionability requires a two-fold determination: that the contractual terms are
unreasonably favorable to the drafter and that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the other party regarding
acceptance of the provisions."). See generally Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in
Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI.L. REV. 1,17 (1993) ("Most statements of the law of
unconscionability now hold that both procedural and substantive unconscionability are required before courts will
grant relief from a challenged term."); Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Unconscionability Revisited: A Comparative
Approach, 68 N.D. L REv. 145,169 (1992) (stating that there are "few instances" when one element exists without
the other).
63. See, e.g., Kinney v. United Healthcare Services, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(saying that unconscionability' s procedural and substantive elements are "reviewed in tandem" such that the greater
the degree of one, the less that is required of the other); Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 849 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (describing a "sliding scale" that lets a strong showing of substantive unconscionability compensate
for a lesser showing of procedural unconscionabiity).
64. One commentator described this shift in the following way:
Whereas Walker-Thomas required that a contractual provision be both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable in order to be stricken, courts now use a so-called sliding scale.
A term is now stricken if the two kinds of unconscionability, considered together, "weigh
enough." In principle, therefore, either procedural or substantive unconscionability is now
sufficient, if it alone "weighs" enough.
SLAWSON, supranote 2, at 142 (footnote omitted); see also Craswell, supra note 62, at 17-18 ("[S]ome courts have
suggested a vaguely mathematical metaphor in which a large amount of one type of unconscionability can make
up for only a small amount of the other.").
65. See, e.g., Communications Maint., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 761 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding no
need to reach issue of procedural unconscionability since there was no substantive unconscionability); Res. Mgmt.
Co. v. Weston Ranch & livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028,1043 (Utah 1985) (noting that procedural unconscionability
alone could support relief, but such a case "would be rare").
66. An adhesion contract is a standard-form contract that provides a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. See
FARNSWORTH, supranote 1,§4.26, at 297 (describing contracts of adhesion). Despite the pejorative term, adhesion
contracts are "part of the fabric of our society" and "should neither be praised nor denounced...." Goodwin v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 970 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (M.D. Ala. 1995). Such arrangements are economically efficient and
accordingly beneficial. See infra note 218 and accompanying text (describing the advantages of standardized
agreements).
67. See infra notes 220, 227 and accompanying text.
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flawed, courts generally conclude that other policing doctrines-such as fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, and mistake-more efficiently redress such contract
formation problems.'
In contrast, it is more difficult for a court to ignore substantive unfairness, even
though substantive unconscionability alone is not supposed to support relief.' In
an exceptional case, the substantive term is so outrageous that it is unenforceable
regardless of procedural issues.70 More often, when substantive unconscionability
is found, some form of its procedural counterpart lurks nearby. 7
In recent times, courts have shown an increasing willingness to find
unconscionability exclusively on substantive grounds.7 2 One example is Browerv.
Gateway 2000, Inc.," a class action suit in which the plaintiffs contended that an
arbitration clause was invalid under UCC § 2-302, among other reasons.74 As an
initial matter, the court considered, then rejected, plaintiffs' procedural argument
that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as an adhesion contract.75 Although
the parties did not possess equal bargaining power, the consumers were not forced
to "take it or leave it;" indeed, they could return the goods to Gateway within thirty
days and buy the products from a competitor.76
Even though procedural unfairness was not present,7 7 the court concluded that
substantive unconscionability alone did justify relief.7I Here, the arbitration clause
unreasonably favored Gateway because of the excessive cost.79 Acknowledging that

68. See Res. Mgmt. Co., 706 P.2d at 1043 (noting that fraud, misrepresentation, duress, and mistake are
superior "tools" in such situations); see also Richard Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal, 18 J.L
& ECON. 293,302 (1975) (stating that procedural unconscionability allows the courts to reach fraud or duress even
if their specific elements are not present).
69. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.28, at 313 (stating the general rule, then noting "some reluctance
to concede that a plainly oppressive term can be legitimized by fairness in bargaining").
70. See, e.g., Vance v. Nat'l Benefit Ass'n, 1999 WL731764 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1999) (selling a credit card
for $1400 when the available credit was $36 was so oppressive as to be unconscionable); Gillman v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824,829 (N.Y. 1988) (alluding to the exception in dictum). Various examinations
have differed regarding the degree to which courts have been willing to grant relief on the basis of substantive
unconscionability alone. See Harrison,supra note 46, at 450 n.14 (listing several sources reaching different
conclusions); see, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The BargainPrinciple and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741, 745
(1982) (identifying ten cases in which unconscionability was based on substantive terms alone).
71. See Harrison, supra note 46, at 490 (noting the great likelihood that "when there is substantive
unfairness, procedural unfairness of some form is also nearby").
72. See, e.g., Eisenberg,supranote 70. at 752-54 (noting a trend towards redressing substantive unfairness
regardless of procedural defects).
73. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
74. Plaintiffs also contended that the clause was invalid under section 2-207, but the court concluded that
that section was inapplicable because the contract essentially involved only one "form"--the paperwork inside the
delivered Gateway box. Thus, an enforceable agreement did not exist until the computer merchandise was retained
beyond the thirty days specified in Gateway's "Agreement." ld; see also Hill v. Gateway, Inc. 2000, 105 F.3d 1147
(7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that section 2-207 was inapplicable for the same reason in an action involving the same
arbitration clause subject to federal claims).
75. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
76. id. Although returning the merchandise would entail work and expense, the court viewed this as a fair
"trade-off for the convenience and savings for which the consumer presumably opted" when she decided to buy
merchandise by phone or mail. ld. at 573.
77. The court looked to the contract formation process, taking into account the transaction's setting, the
aggrieved party's experience and education, the use of "fine print" or high-pressure tactics, and any disparity in
the parties' bargaining power. Id. No factor favored plaintiffs' claim. Id.
78. Id at 574-75.
79. The arbitration procedures required a $4000 advance fee (more than the cost ofmost Gateway products),

Spring 2001 ]

UNCONSCIONABLE QUANDRY

New York law typically required the presence of both procedural and substantive
elements, the court noted that sometimes substantive unconscionability alone is
adequate. 80
c. Consumers and Merchants
When the UCC first introduced the unconscionability concept, legal
commentators assumed that the courts would use it exclusively to protect individual
consumers, not businesses.81 The classic unconscionability action involves an
aggrieved individual consumer, and the courts remain somewhat leery about
82
applying the doctrine to protect sophisticated companies. After all, the concept's83
equitable roots demonstrate a traditional concern for the weaker contracting party.
On the other hand, Section 2-302 certainly does not exclude merchants from its
benefits.84 The law surrounding the use of unconscionability in contracts between
merchants certainly exists, although it is less developed than in the consumer
context.85
Over time, the courts have increasingly extended the unconscionability doctrine
beyond the context of individual consumers to businesses; in fact, today
approximately forty percent of all reported cases involve businesses asserting the
doctrine, 6 with no apparent differences in case results.' The courts will treat some
merchants as "quasi-consumers" based on relative disadvantages such as the

of which $2000 was nonrefundable. Id. at 571.
80. The court cited other cases standing for this proposition. See, e.g., Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. 1988); see also Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Uvestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028,
1043 (Utah 1985) (saying that "gross disparity in terms, absent evidence of procedural unconscionability, can
support a finding of unconscionability").
81. See SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 25 (describing the legal scholars' speculation); see also JAMES J. WHrrE
& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-9, at 155-57 (3d ed. 1988) (noting speculation that
unconscionability would be inapplicable to businesses as a matter of law).
82. See, e.g., Cont'l Airlines v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1527 (9th Cir. 1987) (saying
that it "makes little sense" to invoke unconscionability "in the context of two large, legally sophisticated
companies"); Const. Assoc. v. Fargo Water Equip. Co., 446 N.W.2d 237,242 (N.D. 1989) (expressing skepticism
of unconscionability claim in purely commercial contracts); Hydraform Prod. Corp. v. Am. Steel & Aluminum
Corp., 498 A.2d 339, 344 (N.H. 1985) (declining to apply doctrine, noting that the buyer "was not an innocent in
the industry"); see also Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065,
1066 (1986) (noting that unconscionability has most frequently benefited consumers).
83. See Prince,supra note 22, at 479-80 (describing the consensus among courts and commentators).
84. Some early drafts of Section 2-302 did exclude merchants from using the doctrine if they had an
opportunity to read the agreement. See id at 480 n.105 (citing Leff, supra note 30, at 492-93).
85. See John Edward Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735, 779 (1982) ("If unconscionability is still in its formative stages, the
doctrine is pre-embryonic with respect to merchant-to-merchant transactions."); see also Jane P. Mallor,
Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065,1067 (1986) (saying that "surprisingly little
scholarly attention has focused on the task of articulating standards for unconscionability determinations in
contracts between merchants").
86. See SLAWSON, supra note 3, at 143 ("At least 40 percent of the parties seeking the protections of
unconscionability in the reported cases have been business consumers since 1990.").
87. See id. (describing the courts' extension of the unconscionability doctrine to business consumers);
Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Unconscionability Revisited: A Comparative Approach, 68 N.D. L REv. 145, 150 (1992)
(saying that "it has now become clear that the small business entrepreneur" can also take advantage of the
unconscionability doctrine).
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absence of business experience or less education88 and, even in the absence of such
conditions, will occasionally offer relief 9
2. The Commentators (Mostly) Complain
Commentators have not been generous to the unconscionability doctrine since
its inception. 9' Indeed, the overall perception is that Article 2 has generated much
more controversy and disagreement than has the common law of contract.9 ' In
general, Section 2-302's commentators fall into two categories: supporters who
admire the section's ability to protect against overreaching and unfair contracts92
and detractors who fear that the doctrine's broad and ill-defined reach will
unpredictably undercut the contracting parties' original intentions.9 3
Section 2-302's lack of precision has been subject to ridicule; the section has
been called "an emotionally satisfying incantation" that illustrates that "it is easy
to say nothing with words." This same attribute, on the other hand, makes the
doctrine utterly malleable. Some accordingly assert that unconscionability should
intentionally defy description to be effective-that courts need discretionary space
within which to address unfairness. 95
From a doctrinal perspective, critics have contended that unconscionability is
both too narrow to address unfairness in contracts and too indirect to handle
contract issues that need broad, clear treatment.' Some complain that the concept
is self-contradictory. It recognizes the legitimacy of contracts to which one party
arguably did not give meaningful consent, then denies the agreements' legitimacy
to the extent that they operate unfairly. 97

88. See Prince, supra note 22, at 480 (describing how businesses can be quasi-consumers).
89. Among business entities, certainly some can be more sophisticated-and possess more leverage--than
others. Still, the courts assume that all merchants possess the strength and savvy to avoid procedural
unconscionability:
While courts on rare occasions grant relief to merchants who are not quasi-consumers, such
decisions are inherently suspect with regard to the presence of procedural unconscionability.
The courts have stated that there is a presumption against finding unconscionability in contracts
between merchants. The sophisticated business entity is deemed more likely to guard against
hidden terms in a contract and is held responsible for understanding the terms of the contract.
The sophisticated business entity is more likely not only to have the benefit of counsel, but also
to have alternatives and to be able to bargain effectively for balanced terms. For these reasons,
courts have been reluctant to find that a merchant has been taken advantage of through
unconscionability.
Prince, supra note 22, at 481-82.
90. See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 5, at 293 (stating that the doctrine "has not been without its critics").
91. See SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 160 (noting that a review of contract treatises suggests "the clear
impression that there is much more disagreement about Article 2 than about the common law of contract").
92. Early admirers included: William B. Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code,
22 U. MiAMI L. REv. 121 (1967) (contending that Section 2-302 is a useful device consistent with prior common
law); M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969) (defending Section 2-302 and
rebutting Professor Leff's analysis).
93. See Prince, supra note 22, at 462 (noting the "two camps" for Section 2-302's commentators).
94. Leff, supra note 30, at 558-59.
95. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 68, at 304 (stating that the doctrine's strength is its flexibility); Prince,
supra note 22, at 470-71 (describing how lack of precision assists flexibility).
96. See DiMatteo, supra note 5, at 293 (describing these criticisms and presenting possible alternatives).
97. See SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 144 (describing the doctrine's self-contradictory underpinnings).
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The classic procedural/substantive dichotomy, first proposed by Arthur Leff,"
has also frequently been criticized. Although the distinction can be analytically
9
interest-ing, some view it as not terribly meaningful.9 Commentators have stretched
°
the limits of their creativity in the search for alternatives." Professor Murray, for
example, favors two different unconscionability categories. "" The first group would
be the "unexpected" contract that subjects one party to unfair surprise,102 and the
superior
second involves "no choice" agreements-ones in which a party possessing 03
bargaining power dictates terms to a party having no reasonable option., Alternatively, it has been suggested that the traditional unconscionability analysis be
abandoned in favor of the reasonable expectations approach, which would grant the
consumer's reasonable expectations even if unconscionability is not established."°
agree that
Despite long-standing fears, business law experts today generally
0 " The past thirty
Section 2-302 has not been the disaster that many had predicted.'
years ofjudicial application have demonstrated that the unconscionability concept,

98. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
99. See Craswell, supra note 62, at 18 ("Some scholars have questioned the utility of the entire
distinction."); Harrison, supra note 46, at 489-90 (saying that the two-prong approach is interesting, but "it is not
terribly useful").
100. Many original approaches have been suggested for handling the inequalities inherent in adhesion
contracts. See, e.g., Todd Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1174,
1176 (1983) (suggesting that adhesion contracts be presumptively unenforceable).
101. See MURRAY, supra note 19, § 96, at 492-95 (presenting Professor Murray's suggested
unconscionability analysis). Murray prefers this approach because it emphasizes the two dominant themes found
in unconscionability case law, requiring courts "to apply these two pervasive concepts to the huge tapestry of fact
situations which continue to unfold." Id. at 495. This, Murray argues, is preferable to the "illusion of certainty"
created by the traditional procedural/substantive dichotomy and has greater utility than a laundry fist of elements
typically present in, but not essential to, unconscionability cases. Id For example, a standard-form contract is often
present in unconscionability cases, but is certainly not crucial to the holding. See id. § 96, at 495 n.36 (discussing
how courts employing unconscionability "laundry lists" often include standardized agreements on the list). A
Pennsylvania court incorporated Murray's approach in 1985. Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawfinson, 491 A.2d 138,
146-48 (Pa. Super Ct. 1985) (adopting the "unexpected" and "no choice" unconscionability analyses).
102. "Unexpected" unconscionability often appears in the context of boilerplate forms, where a seller can
inject material, risk-shifting terms that the buyer would not expect to find. MURRAY, supra note 19, § 96, at 494-95
(describing the elements of "unexpected unconscionability").
103. The "no choice" contract involves oppression because the weaker party requires certain goods or
services that are essential to his physical or economic well being and has no reasonable alternative. This is the
classic adhesion contract. Id. § 96, at 495 (explaining the "no choice" prong of his analysis).
104. Professor Slawson compares the two doctrines as follows:
[Unconscionability] is much less effective against abuses of bargaining power. Whereas
reasonable expectations gives the consumer his reasonable expectations in every case,
unconscionability requires the court to conclude that the contract or contract term will operate
very unfairly against the consumer in the particular case, and the consumer has the burden of
persuading the court to reach this conclusion. The result is that unconscionability decisions are
too particularized to the facts of the case to constitute precedents, and the doctrine falls to
generate any sizable body of law to protect consumers.
SLAWSON, supranote 2, at 57. Given the similarities between the doctrines, the two doctrines often support each
other in the same cases. See id. at 57 (noting that early reasonable expectations cases also rested on
unconscionability); see, e.g., C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (applying
both doctrines and using a tentative draft of UCC § 2-302).
105. Even Professor Leff, who was Section 2-302's first principal critic, predicted that the courts would
"most likely adjust, entrusting the irritating aspects of the Section with a smoothing nacre of more or less
reasonable applications, or the legislatures may act if things get out of hand." Leff, supra note 30, at 558-59.
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though amorphous, is workable.1"e Thus, although courts and commentators
continue to complain about unconscionability, the doctrine has ultimately achieved
a grumbling acceptance, largely because the courts have been reasonably
restrained. t 7
II. ARTICLE 2 REVISIONS
Given the intense criticism surrounding the unconscionability doctrine, as well
as the need to overhaul and update Article 2, it is not surprising that revision efforts
were forthcoming. What has been of great interest, however, is the protracted and
excruciating nature of the revision process itself as contract law experts have
wrestled with the various substantive alternatives proposed to replace the current
Section 2-302 formulation.
A. Endless Process
1. The Big Picture
The Article 2 revision saga began twelve years ago and is still ongoing.0 8
Although the rather messy UCC revision process" has been extensively
critiqued," 0 private law-making often provokes criticism, given the difficult balance
of competing interests such work necessarily involves."' Even if the end result
presents an improvement, the revision process undeniably entails a significant drain
2
on both human and fiscal resources."

106. See Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 121 ("Though the concept is vague, courts can work with it,
and merchants can live with it.").
107. See Prince,supra note 22, at 463 (describing the "general comfort of courts and commentators").
108. In 1988, the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) appointed a study group to consider whether revisions
were necessary. Based on the group's recommendation, the PEB authorized the appointment ofan Article 2 drafting
committee and a reporter in 1991. For an in-depth discussion of the process surrounding the Article 2 revisions
1991-99, see Rusch, supra note 15. Professor Rusch served both as an observer and an associate reporter in the
uniform law revision process.
109. See Fred H. Miller, Realism Not idealismin Uniform Laws-Observationsfromthe Revision ofthe UCC,
39 S. TEx. L REV. 707, 707 (1998) ("It is said that if you like sausage you should not watch it being made. The
same observation has been made about legislation."). Professor Miller is Executive Director of the NCCUSL and
a member of the AL. His article provides a very informative overview of how the process works generally and how
consumer issues were served in this particular set of revisions. See id
110. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces& David Frisch, Commercial Codificationas Negotiation,32 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 17, 20 (1998) (concluding "that the article 2 revision project may not, as currently realized, be worth the
commercial law candle").
Ill. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Juggling ShareholderRights and Strike Suits in DerivativeLitigation:The
ALI Dropsthe Ball, 77 MINN. L REV. 1339 (1993) (arguing that the ALI's massive Corporate Governance Project
yielded unworkable results due, at least in part, to the pressures of competing business law factions).
112. The ad hoc nature of the revision process only underscores that expense:
[Tihe rulemaking process has a tendency to expand and lose focus during consideration of
proposals. The proposals may not even be related to the specific problems that caused the
revision process to be undertaken; they may also fail to connect to any of the recommendations
of the study committee.
Such an ad hoc approach is costly. Dozens, sometimes hundreds, of lawyers and academics
periodically meet, usually for days at a time, to debate the myriad of rulemaking proposals that
are advanced. This effort goes on for years: It takes anywhere from three to five years for a
statutory change to have been studied, drafted, and first proposed for legislative enactment. This
requires an enormous devotion of human and professional capital. Other costs result from the
inevitable transition and re-education of the commercial law community. Furthermore, indirect
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In general, the uniform law revision process provokes two fundamental public
policy concerns. 1 3 First, by definition, uniform laws should be adopted uniformly,
although absolute uniformity today is likely less important than it was when the
4
UCC was first developed a half-century ago." Some contend that the fact of
revision can itself be a mistake because of the difficulties associated with achieving
uniform enactment of any revised approach.' Karl Llewellyn himself anticipated
that amending the UCC would be difficult, saying it was "the problem of the semipermanent code."'1 6 7In fact, the original Article 2 has seen no important
amendments to date."
The second overriding concern is how to accommodate diverse voices in the
revision process. Business law commentators worry that interest groups will unduly
8
influence the process in the absence of equally powerful, countervailing interests."
Ultimately, the end result necessitates some compromise among the various
interests, which may mean that the final balance satisfies no one.
"9
In the face of such universal concerns, the Article 2 revision process started
and moved forward, operating in a remarkably open fashion. The NCCUSL and the
American Law Institute (ALI) act together as partners in the Article 2 revision
process. The drafting committee consists of NCCUSL and ALI members. The

costs may result from inadvertent ambiguities and problems of the revised statutory language:
New rules can raise new problems of interpretation.
Steven L Schwarcz, A FundamentalInquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of PrivateLegislatures, 29
GA. L REV. 909,917-18 (1995) (footnotes omitted). Of course, the instant process has lasted much longer than
the "three to five years" Schwarcz suggests.
113. In addition to these fundamental concerns, there are numerous other criticisms of the uniform law
revision process. One recurring issue is the lack of meaningful empirical data supporting the need for revisions.
See Alces & Frisch, supra note 110, at 68 (saying "it is essential that rule makers have a reasonably accurate
understanding of how the system (broadly conceived) works," but that the committee often must make decisions
armed only with conclusory assertions, anecdotal evidence, and reported case opinions); see also Rusch, supranote
15, at 1692 (citing numerous process problems, including the observation that "the wring people are at the
table"--that business people and consumers, rather than lawyers, should discuss the "reasonable standards" and
that lobbyists lacking knowledge of current commercial law standards hinder progress).
114. Now that a "core" uniformity under the UCC exists, a more liberal view of uniformity is reasonable.
See Miller, supra note 37, at 721-26 (discussing how the uniformity concept has eased over time).
115. Professor Slawson articulated this concern as follows:
We do not want to amend [Article 2] if the amendment would destroy its uniformity among the
states, because this would defeat one of the purposes for which it was enacted. Therefore, no
state should amend it unless all states will enact the same amendment, but it is nearly impossible
to obtain such universal agreement if the amendment is controversial, and almost any important
amendment will be controversial.
SLAWSON, supranote 2, at 159.
116. ALt & NCCUSL Reportand Second Draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act (1941), in 1 ELIZABETH
SLUSSER KELLEY, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 269, 302 (1984).
117. See SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 159 (describing the absence of significant revisions and the need for
comprehensive reforms).
118. See Rusch, supra note 15, at 1689 (noting the "often repeated" concern that interest groups "may
capture the process").
119. The revision process can be instigated in several ways-because of influential law review articles, or
through study by the PEB orthe American Bar Association (ABA). Regardless of origin, the PEB initially considers
any suggestion for UCC revision. See Miller, supra note 37, at 712-13 (describing the early stages in detail). The
Article 2 revision process began because of a PEB study. See id. at 712 n. 13.
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committee has met regularly" ° since 1991. These well-attended"' public meetings
have included American Bar Association (ABA) advisors" 2 and representatives of
various consumer and business interest groups. " The drafting committee routinely
entertains the suggestions provided by observers and advisors. 2 4 Periodically,
Article 2 drafts are also presented to the ALI and the NCCUSL membership.
During the past eight years, the drafting committee moved forward in fits and
starts, and emotions sometimes ran high. 25 By 1997, certain Article 2 revisions
provoked heated controversy, especially those sections aimed at consumer
protection. 26 Business interests regarded the changes as unwarranted, and the
resulting tensions forced a cooling-off period that postponed drafting committee
meetings until the following March.' In 1998 and 1999, industry and consumer
representatives continued to debate the consumer protection provisions, and the
committee did its best to craft a workable compromise that would achieve final
approval."'
2. 1999: The Collapse of Consensus
Just when the lengthy drafting odyssey appeared to be drawing to an end, the
process derailed. In 1999, after receiving the ALI's final approval, the revisions
went before NCCUSL at its annual July meeting. Although business interests

120. The drafting committee typically meets for long weekends three times a year. See Rusch, supra note
15, at 1684 n.5 (saying that meetings "ran from Friday morning through Sunday noon"); see also Miller, supranote
37, at 714 (noting that "[t]he
period for these meetings begins inSeptember and concludes in April, about two and
one half months before [NCCUSL's] annual meeting.. .at the end of July").
121. Attendance has ranged from 40 persons to more than 100. See Rusch, supra note 15, at 1684 n.5
(discussing attendance at drafting meetings).
122. The ABA eventually named three advisors to the project. See id. at 1683 n.3 (noting the ABA
appointments).
123. In fact, the drafting committee has the task of identifying those interests "that will operate under or be
otherwise impacted by the statute, and that thus presumably can, and have an incentive to, contribute insight into
its formulation." Miller, supra note 37, at 716.
124. See Rusch, supra note 15, at 1684 (noting that "[t]he receptiveness of the drafting committee to
suggestions by people not on the drafting committee was remarkable"). This open process, in many respects, was
a significant benefit. As one five-year participant in the revisions process has noted:
NCCUSL has worked hard to open up the process so that those who have the time and the
money to attend meetings may participate in the process. The drafts are widely circulated and
available electronically. This wider net facilitates bringing more people to the table with a
variety of experiences that informs the drafting committee regarding the merits and demerits of
particular proposals for the drafts. The Article 2 drafting committee meetings were open. The
chair allowed everyone present to voice views, sometimes resulting in meetings that bogged
down, but all viewpoints had an opportunity to speak.
Id. at 1691.
125. For example, industry representatives began to complain that the drafting committee was too "probuyer" and "anti-seller", and that "[many of the law professors on the panel have a pro-consumer bias, or are
liberals." See Jonathan Groner, Crackingthe Commercial Code: An ambitiousattempt to bring the UCC into the
computer age has some software providers bugged, THE REcoRDER,Nov. 4, 1993, at I (noting that "[a]s
the
process of revision heats up, so does the clamor on both sides").
126. See Rusch, supra note 15, at 1684-85 (describing the "tremendous fire" drawn by the consumer
provisions).
127. See id. at 1685 (discussing the drafting committee's cooling-off period).
128. See id. at 1685 (saying that in the final year, the committee "began to crystallize its approaches to
various difficult issues" and that the consumer protection sections occupied the bulk of the committee's time).
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continued to object to the revisions,'29 the drafting committee fully expected that

NCCUSL would endorse the long-debated changes. Rather than taking action on the
project, NCCUSL surprised the committee by opting to defer the revisions' final
reading "in large part, because of fear of continued industry opposition to the draft
and the perceived threat of nonuniform enactment of the revised article."'"
The unexpected break in the NCCUSL proceedings frustrated many in
attendance. After the seemingly interminable hard work and consensus building, it
was difficult to believe that the revisions were being thrown back for further
examination and redrafting. NCCUSL's executive director said that the revisions
had already achieved "the best balance we can" and that "it isn't going to get
better."'' NCCUSL's president was similarly frustrated by the group's inability to
finalize the revisions,32noting that NCCUSL should "bite the bullet" and approve the
suggested changes.

129. These concerns can be summarized as follows:
The first and most obvious problem with proposed Article 2 is that many politically powerful
commercial interests strenuously object to it in its present form and will oppose it in state
legislatures. It is reasonable to expect that they will succeed in blocking adoption of Article 2
in some states and fail in others. Unless consensus is reached before the July meeting of the
National Conference, which is unlikely, its approval at that meeting would put the uniformity
of state commercial law in jeopardy.
There are many radical changes proposed, according to the objectors, without evidence that
buyers and sellers are inadequately served by current law....
The overarching objection, however, is to what has been aptly termed "costly tinkering."
Almost every section of Article 2 has been rewritten. Sections have been broken apart,
recombined and reshuffled. The relevance of decades of decisional law would immediately be
put in question by adoption of this new Article. It would take years of litigation to determine
which changes are substantive and which are not. The appropriate standard, say the objectors,
which would avert this disaster, is to make changes only where they are demonstrably necessary
to alleviate serious problems of buyers or sellers.
Martin F. Connor, A Look at the Current Uniform Law Agenda of the NCCUSL, METROPOLrTAN CORP. COUNS.
(New York Metro Edition), July 1999, at 42.
130. See Rusch, supra note 15, at 1684 (saying that these reasons for deferment were revealed in discussions
between NCCUSL leadership and the drafting committee following the meeting announcement). The joint ALl and
NCCUSL news release, which is available through the ALI's website, explained NCCUSL's inability to finalize
the Article 2 revisions in the following way:
In May of this year the AL approved revised versions of both Articles 2 and 2A that were the
result of many years of collaborative effort by the two organizations. At the annual meeting of
NCCUSL in July, opposition to certain sections of Article 2, which regulates the sale of goods
to consumers and to merchants, led the leadership ofNCCUSL, which has the sole responsibility
for seeking enactment of UCC revisions in the state legislatures, to conclude that the prospects
for uniform adoption throughout the country required additional review of some provisions.
Accordingly, the NCCUSL annual meeting took no action with respect to either Article 2 or 2A.
ALl & NCCUSL Aug. 18, 1999 Press Release, supra note 15.
131. The full quote of Fred Miller, NCCUSL's executive director, at the ALI's annual meeting in 1999 was
as follows:
I would make two observations. One, I have been a commissioner for over 25 years. I have
taught commercial law for that same period of time. If you take an objective look at the Revised
Article 2 you will find there are many benefits in there that will reduce litigation costs, prevent
litigation, answer questions. It is a quality product from the standpoint of substance. It is also
true that I think we have reached the best balance we can. If you are going to delay this for a
year, yes, you can upset the balance one way or the other and that's going to have an impact on
enactment. I think it's time to let it go. If you want to kill it, kill it, I agree with Mr. Langrock,
but do not delay it, it isn't going to get better.
Rusch, supra note 15, at 1685 (quoting the unedited transcript from the ALl's annual meeting of 1999, at 904-05).
132. Gene LeBrun, NCCUSL's president, nicely summarized the frustrations following the conference
determination to defer the Article 2 vote:

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 31

After the controversial 1999 meeting, the ALI and NCCUSL jointly announced
the formation of a new drafting committee to continue the revisions effort.' In
doing so, the ALI deferred to NCCUSL's judgment, hoping ultimately for a result
that would satisfy all interests."3 The ALI acknowledged that the new draft must
"be fair, balanced, and useful, and recognized as such by those whom it will affect"
2, which "has served the
so that it will be a worthy successor to the
35 current Article
nation's commerce for half a century.'
Today, the revisions have apparently stalled. The current drafting committee was
unable to procure approval from either the ALI or NCCUSL at their annual
meetings in 2000, and it is unclear whether the revisions will ever become reality. 36
In any event, it is important to keep in mind that any approval of the Article 2
revisions will not end the process. Should amendments ultimately be promulgated,
each commissioner then has a duty to cause her state legislature to consider the
as hoped, the NCCUSLjurisdictions would uniformly enact
proposal. 13" If all goes
38

the revised Code.

[This project has been around between NCCUSL and the ALI for 12 years... and eight years in
the drafting process. It's had innumerable Drafting Committee sessions, it's been before the ALI
Council, it's been before this membership before, it has been before the body of NCCUSL, we
have had four Drafting Committee meetings in the last year. All of the issues which have been
discussed here have been discussed many, many times on the floor of the conference
and particularly with the Drafting Committee. I don't think that further delay is going to change
the matter. We have to bite the bullet at some point in time.
Id. at 1685-86 (quoting the unedited transcript from the ALI's annual meeting of 1999, at 892-93).
133. The news release making the joint announcement is available through ALI's web site. See ALl &
NCCUSL Aug. 18, 1999 Press Release, supra note 15.
134. AL Director. Lance Liebman, diplomatically described the reconstituted revisions efforts as follows:
The American Law Institute believes that the revised versions of Article 2 and Article 2A that
it approved in May reflected a fair and balanced treatment of the many difficult issues presented
and offered the promise of genuine improvement in the law. Nevertheless, the Institute is
deferring to the judgment of the National Conference, its long-time partner in the drafting of the
Uniform Commercial Code, that more work is needed to achieve a statute capable of uniform
enactment. A distinguished committee will now seek to reconcile the differences of view about
some of the most contentious provisions.
ALl & NCCUSL Aug. 18, 1999 Press Release, supranote 15.
135. Id.
136. The revisions ultimately stalled because of difficulty defining the article's scope with respect to "smart
goods." Shortly after NCCUSL's annual meeting ended in early August, the managing editor of the UCC
Bulletin/UCC Reporting Service sent out the following email message entitled "NCCUSL defers Rev. 2 again":
Rev. 2 Drafting Chair Bill Henning announced that they were not ready to present a final draft
that would then be subject to approval by AL next May...as had been planned. The reason is
the coverage-of-"smart goods" problem. A new "if an integral part of the goods" test for
coverage of embedded chips was discussed in a very tentative manner inasmuch as not even the
drafting committee had signed offon it yet. Not even "sense of the house" votes were considered
due to the extremely preliminary nature of these discussions. More details in the next UCC
Bulletin.
E-mail from Chris Hoving, Managing Editor of the UCC Bulletin/UCC Reporting Service, to ucclawl@assocdir.wuacc.edu (Aug. 4, 2000) (on file with the author); see also Press Release, NCCUSL, Uniform Law
Group Wraps Up Meeting (Aug. 3, 2000) (describing the six uniform acts approved, but saying nothing about
progress on the Article 2 revisions), available at http://www.nccusl.org/pressreleases/pr8-3-00-2.htm.
137. The state bar association often facilitates this process by creating a revision committee to review and
make appropriate recommendations. See Miller, supra note 37, at 716 (describing the process of taking revisions
to the states).
138. These jurisdictions include all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the United States
Virgin Islands. See id. at 716 n.23 (noting the National Conference jurisdictions and the adoption success rate for
various UCC articles).
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B. Substantive Options
The Article 2 revision process has seen more than its fair share of surprises and
setbacks, but the process of change is not the drafters' sole concern, nor even their
greatest. A parade of substantive choices complicates their task.
1. Early Considerations
By the end of the 1980s, many agreed that UCC revisions were necessary. 39 The
initial study group appointed to consider revising Article 2 did not believe that
Section 2-302's text required changes; instead, the group recommended only that
the section be moved to Article 1 to make it applicable to all UCC articles."4 As for
the Official Comments, the study group urged several clarifications. In essence, the
group wanted the comments to elucidate the doctrine's application in terms of the
procedural/substantive 4dichotomy, contract inducement, contract enforcement, and
the consumer context.1 1
As. for the Article 2 drafting committee, it viewed Section 2-302 as too openended and difficult to particularize.' 42 Noting that the unconscionability doctrine
had not often been used to invalidate sales contracts, the committee wrote,
A survey reveals relatively few cases under Article 2 where former 2-302 is
involved and even fewer cases finding a contract or clause unconscionable. This
could mean that there is less unconscionability in the world than one might
imagine-that strong sellers and buyers have cleaned up their acts. It could also
mean that it is difficult for consumers to litigate these issues and that the courts
are not getting a steady flow of cases to decide. Given the relatively small size
of consumer claims and the absence of provisions in Article 2 for punitive
damages, attorney fees and class actions and the growing use of arbitration and
mediation, the latter explanation is more probable than the former. Thus, one

139. With changing technology, there was a sense that the Code at least needed updating:
[Nlearly everyone in the business community agrees that the Uniform Commercial Code-the
bane of law students but the centerpiece of a century-old effort to standardize the common
law-is an outdated document that was fine when contracts were typed in triplicate, but is in
many ways out of touch with the computer age.
Jonathan Groner, The Uniform Commercial Code Does Not Compute, N.J. LJ., Nov. 8, 1993, at 6.
140. The study group issued a Preliminary Report in 1990 before the drafting committee formed. See
generally Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formationand Modiftcation Under Revised Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY
L REV. 1305, 1305-06 (1994) (describing the early stages of the revision process). The Preliminary Report, which
indicates the group's recommendation to relocate section 2-303, appears in a published appraisal conducted under
the ABA's Committee on the UCC. See Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk
Transfers, and Documents of Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, An Appraisal of the March ).
1990, PreliminaryReportof the Uniform Commercial CodeArticle 2 Study Group, 16 DELl .CoRP. L. 981, 107374 (1991) [hereinafter Article 2 Appraisal].
141. The Preliminary Report raised three key questions to be addressed in Section 2-302 comment revisions:
(I) whether meaningful choice could outweigh complete disclosure; (2) whether the unconscionability test should
be expanded to include the inducement and enforcement phases; and (3) whether Section 2-302 should be more
clearly aimed at consumer rather than commercial contracts. See Prince, supranote 22, at 464 n.20 (citing the
Preliminary Report at 2-3).
142. See Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4 at 137 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-105 note 3 (Revision Draft Mar. I,
1998)).
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should not rely upon litigation in court under
vague standards as the primary
43
method against unconscionable behavior.

Regarding the existing doctrine as relatively ineffective, the drafters began
reviewing possible formulations for making unconscionability more efficient and
meaningful.
From the start, there was no consensus concerning how the revised Article 2
should specifically address consumer issues, given the fact that consumers could be
both buyers and sellers.'" The ABA task force had nonetheless pressed for the
consideration of a statute dealing with consumer transactions, saying, "Isn't it time
to try to deal in a statutory way with the adhesion contract?"' 45 Although the states
had aggressively enacted consumer protection legislation, the UCC drafting
committee concluded that the states' laws were not an effective substitute for a
workable unconscionability doctrine under Article 2." Thus, from the revision

project's earliest stages, it was apparent that consumer protection would be even
more controversial than it was fifty years ago and would need to be directly
confronted. 117
2. The Initial Drafts
The drafting committee initially addressed Section 2-302 under two possible
48
approaches. The earliest view was to follow Article 2A for consumer contracts.
It extended Section 2-302's reach by expanding the time frame for determining

unconscionability and by increasing the available remedies. Under this version,
Section 2-302 would police consumer contracts "induced by unconscionable
conduct" or whenever such conduct "occurred in the collection of a claim arising
143. Id. at 137-38 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-105 note 3 (Revision Draft Mar. 1, 1998)).
144. See id. at 122 (stating that "[flrom the beginning, in the PEB preliminary study report, the ABA Task
Force report that responded to the preliminary report and the PEB final study report, there has been [such]
disagreement"); see also Article 2 Appraisal, supra note 141, at 994-96, 1000-09 (discussing the problem of
consumer protection); PEB Study Group: Uniform Commercial Code, Article2 Executive Summary, 46 BUS. LAW.
1869, 1876, 1878 (1991) (same).
145. See Article 2 Appraisal, supra note 140, at 1005 (responding to the PEB's Study Committee Report).
146. The drafters said,
Although we have done no systematic study, it is clear that consumer protection laws among the
states vary in scope and coverage. There is no uniformity here. Some states have little or no
consumer protection legislation while others have comprehensive legislation. Moreover, there
frequently are gaps between federal law and state law in particular areas, such as consumer
warranties. The risk is that litigation will arise in states with weak consumer protection laws or
that stronger parties will select that law through choice of law clauses. Article 2, then, is
justified in providing some consumer protection rules to fill the gaps.
U.C.C. § 2-105 note 3 (Revision Draft Mar. 1, 1998), quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 138.
147. See Miller, supra note 37, at 727 (stating that "today the question of consumer protection in the Code
is even more controversial because the consumer movement has come of age" and that "code amendments had to
better accommodate consumer interests for both fairness and enactability reasons).
148. As the current Reporter for Articles 2 and 2A recently explained,
I did not try to conform [Revised Article 2A's unconscionability section] to Revised Article 2,
as the question between the two articles has not been whether Article 2A should conform to
Article 2, but whether Article 2 should conform to Article 2A. Although we have chosen not to
conform Article 2 to Article 2A, there has never been any real problem with Article 2A as it is,
so there does not seem to be any pressing reason for conformity except for the sake of
conformity.
U.C.C. § 2A-108 reporter's note (Revision Draft Mar. 2000).
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from the consumer contract."' 49 This first view was quickly eliminated.
The second, more reduced model largely reverted to the original Section 2-302
language, except that it still denied the enforcement of contract terms "induced by
unconscionable conduct. " ts In short, this "inducement" focus suggested that
unconscionability would result if the agreement "would never have been entered
into if unconscionable means had not been employed to induce the agreement to the
contract."'' As the drafting committee struggled to achieve the appropriate balance,
consumer protection concerns dominated the discussion.152 Subject to heavy
149. 'This short-lived approach also awarded attorney's fees under appropriate circumstances. The revised
text under this approach read,
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.

(b) If the court as a matter of law finds that a consumer contract or any clause of such
contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct or that unconscionable conduct has
occurred in the collection of a claim arising from the consumer contract, the court may grant
appropriate relief.
(c)Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (a) or (b), the court, on
its own motion or that of a party, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the contract or clause thereof, or ofthe conduct.
(d) In an action in which a party claims unconscionability with respect to a consumer
contract:
(I) If the court finds unconscionability under subsection (a) or (b), the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to the consumer.
(2) If the court does not find unconscionability and the consumer claiming
unconscionability has brought or maintained an action known to be groundless, the court shall
award reasonable attorney's fees to the party against whom the claim is made.
(3) In determining attorney's fees, the amount of the recovery on behalf of the claimant
under subsections (a) and (b) is not controlling.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (Revision Draft Feb. 17, 1993), quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 136 n.61.
150. This slimmed-down approach read as follows:
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made or induced by unconscionable conduct, the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the.
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result.
(b) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (a) or (b), the court, on
its own motion or that of a party, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the contract or clause thereof, or of the contract.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (Revision Draft Dec. 21, 1993), quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 136 n.62.
151. U.C.C. § 2-105 note I (Revision Draft July 1997). This note also gave examples of unfair practices that
induce the contract,
such as taking advantage of a consumer's inability to protect his or her interest, or contracting
with knowledge that the consumer is unable to receive a substantial benefit from the transaction,
unreasonable delay and pressure in concluding the contract, or making misleading statements
of opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely.
Id., quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4 at 136-37 n.64.
152. A subcommittee appointed specifically to address the extent to which Article 2 should include consumer
protection provisions reported to the drafting committee in advance of NCCUSL's 1996 annual meeting. The
drafting committee praised the report as seeking to achieve a workable middle ground:
The Report takes a balanced but cautious approach. Thus, the Report rejects the extremes of
excluding consumer protection provisions altogether or turning Article 2 into a consumer
protection statute. Rather, the emphasis is on rules that clarify and expand the information flow
between seller and buyer, particularly where there is a consensus on those rules in the cases or
legislative developments, or there is clear evidence that the current text creates serious potential
for unfair surprise or prejudice or the rule is needed because of other changes.
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criticism, the inducement language disappeared from the draft by December
1997.'
Still searching for more precision in the unconscionability approach," 5 the
drafters' March 1998 version renumbered Section 2-302 to make it Section 2-105,
thus placing unconscionability as a section of general application in Article 2. The
draft adhered to the original language, but did include a comment concluding that
"Article 2, then, is justified in providing some consumer protection rules to fill the
gaps [left by state consumer protection laws]."' 55
There remained considerable disagreement about how to enhance the doctrine's
effectiveness. Within two months, a new draft Section 2-105 appeared for
discussion purposes." 6 Although subsections (a) and (c) presented no deviation
from the original Section 2-302, the proposed subsection (b) provided special relief
in consumer contracts. 157 In essence, the suggested revision provided that in a
contract between an individual and a merchant,' 58 non-negotiable terms
authenticated by the individual would be deemed unconscionable if the individual
knew nothing about the term and the term varied unreasonably from industry
standards or presented substantial conflict-either with a negotiated term or with

Richard E. Speidel, May 1996 Draft,ProgressReport to NCCUSL (accompanying July 1996 Draft of Revised
Article 2, Sales for the 1996 Annual Meeting of NCCUSL), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/biulc/
ulc_frame.htm (last visited July 2,2001).
153. The inducement language was removed in the December 1, 1997 partial draft. Greenfield & Rusch,
supra note 4, at 136 (citing the respective drafts in which the inducement language appeared and noting the
objections raised).
154. The drafters felt that more precision was necessary because the original Section 2-302's
unconscionability standards were too vague for an effective remedy. See U.C.C. § 2-105 note 3 (Revision Draft
Mar. 1, 1998) (describing in detail the reasons for concluding that Section 2-302's application had been relatively
ineffectual), quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 137.
155. Id.
156. The notes following the new draft Section 2-105 clearly stated that this section had not been approved
by the drafting committee and was presented only to focus discussion on the relevant issues. See U.C.C. § 2-105
note 2 (Revision Draft May 1. 1998), quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 5, at 138-39.
157. The May 1998 draft provided:
(a) If a court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(b) In a consumer contract [contract between an individual and a merchant], non-negotiable
[non-negotiated] terms in a record which the [consumer] [individual] has authenticated or to
which it has agreed by conduct are unconscionable if:
(1)the consumer [individual] had no knowledge of them; and
(2) the term:
(A) varies unreasonably from applicable industry standards or commercial practices;
(B) substantially conflicts with one or more negotiated terms in the agreement; or
(C) substantially conflicts with an essential purpose of the contract.
This subsection does not apply to a term disclaiming or modifying an implied warranty in
accordance with another section of this article.
(c) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any term of the contract may
be unconscionable the parties must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as
to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-105 (Revision Draft May 1, 1998), quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 138 n.67.
158. The draft left open the possibility that Section 2-105(b) might apply to contracts between merchants and
individuals, rather than limiting its application just to consumer contracts. U.C.C. § 2-105 note 2 (Revision Draft
May 1, 1998) (stating that the "bracketed language" leaves open that interpretation for discussion), quoted in
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 138-39.
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the agreement's purpose. The drafters intended that the new language would state
"'more clearly what terms are unconscionable without stating a rule that applies in
every case"' 9 and would "provide more protection than some courts have given
under the standards of subsection (a) when interpreted to require oppression or
extreme one-sidedness."'' 1
The proposed subsection was to apply only to non-negotiable terms 6' because
such circumstances reflect the "core element of the so-called contract of adhesion
' Most often, buyers lack
and signals the potential absence of meaningful choice."162
choice when the non-negotiable term appears as undisclosed boilerplate or is
disclosed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Subsection (b) would apply to the former,
but not the latter, since it required that the buyer lack knowledge.
As for the knowledge requirement, the thrust of subsection (b) was to protect
against unfair surprise. 63 Thus, unconscionability would be available under
subsection (b) only if the consumer lacked awareness of the offending clause, even
if the consumer knew the term was there, but did not comprehend its import.'64 If
the consumer possessed knowledge, recovery would still be possible pursuant to 2105(a). The May 1998 approach to unconscionability dissolved in the face of stiff
65
opposition, and the language once again reverted to its original configuration.
3. The Last-Ditch Attempt for Real Reform in 1999
In May 1999, there was a final effort to "provide a little meat on the bare bones
of unconscionability."" The May draft left the March 1998 section placement
undisturbed but changed the wording to read,
159. U.C.C. § 2-105 (Revision Draft May 1, 1998), quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 139.
160. id.
161. The bracketed language in subsection (b) suggested the possible substitution of"non-negotiated" for
"non-negotiable." U.C.C. § 2-105(b) (Revision Draft May 1, 1998) (providing "non-negotiated" in brackets). The
drafters favored "non-negotiable" because non-negotiable'...is easier to understand than the phrase "nonnegotiated." What does it mean to negotiate a term? Even if the concept includes a simple discussion of the term
by the parties, that surely would give the other party "knowledge" of the term and foreclose the application of
subsection (b)." U.C.C. § 2-105 note 2 (Revision Draft May 1, 1998), quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note
5, at 139. Another distinction, according to the drafters, would be that non-negotiable terms should likely appear
in fine print. See id. ("A negotiable term is not likely to be contained in the fine print.").
162. U.C.C. § 2-105, note 2 (Revision Draft May 1. 1998), quoted in Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at
139.
163. See id. (describing the policies underlying the knowledge requirement).
164. See id (saying that a consumer would be bound by an arbitration clause that she knew about, even if
she did not understand what arbitration meant). Of course, unfair surprise can also result when the buyer is
vulnerable because of age, education, intelligence, experience, relative bargaining power, or incoherence of the
contract terms in question. See NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Wilson, 478 S.E.2d 769,771 (Ga. 1996) (describing the
relevant factors). Subsection (b) does not address these other elements of unfair surprise once the knowledge
requirement is met.
165. See U.C.C. § 2-105 (Revision Draft Feb. 1, 1999) (using original Section 2-302 language); U.C.C. §
2-105 (Revision Draft Feb. 15, 1999) (same); U.C.C. § 2-105 (Revision Draft May 1, 1999) (same).
166. Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 141 (describing in detail the attempts to strengthen the
unconscionability doctrine during the first part of 1999); see also id at 140-44. The new approach to section 2-105
was pieced together by a special task force. Id. at 141 ("the final draft of revised Article 2 settled due to the efforts
of the consumer task force"). After the March drafting committee meeting, NCCUSL leadership had appointed the
"Consumer/ndustry Task Force," which met with industry and consumer representatives to resolve areas of
disagreement. Memorandum from Larry Bugge (Drafting Committee Chair), Dick Speidel (Reporter) and Linda
Rusch (Associate Reporter) to Members of the American Law Institute (May 10, 1999) (describing revisions to the
May 1999 draft), available at http://207.103.196.3/ai/11999%5Fbudge.htm.
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(a) If a court as a matter of law finds a contract or any term thereof to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term,
or so limit the application of an unconscionable term as to avoid an
unconscionable result.
(b) In a consumer contract a nonnegotiated term in a standard form record is
unconscionable and is not enforceable if it:
(1) eliminates the essential purpose of the contract;
(2) subject to Section 2-202, conflicts with other material terms to which
the parties have expressly agreed; or
(3) imposes manifestly unreasonable risk or cost on the consumer in the
circumstances.
(c) If a court as a matter of law finds that a consumer contract or any term
thereof has been induced by unconscionable conduct or that unconscionable
conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a consumer
contract, the court may grant appropriate refief. 67
(d) If it is claimed or appears to the court that a contract or any term thereof
may be unconscionable, the parties must be afforded a reasonable opportunity

to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.'"
In this formulation, subsections (a) and (d) came directly from the former Section
2-302. Subsections (b) and (c), however, provided additional protection for
consumer contracts. Both managed to survive motions to dismiss at the ALI's
annual meeting that spring. 6 9

Subsection (a) again provided the basic test for unconscionability without
defining it. Instead, the drafters quoted the oft-used language from Comment 1 to
former Section 2-302, which provided in relevant part,
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the terms involved are so
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time
of the making of the contract .... The principle is one of the prevention of
of disturbance of allocation of risks
oppression and unfair surprise... and not
70
because of superior bargaining power.
71
Stating that the doctrine was intended to have a relatively broad reach,' the
drafters noted that most courts require a "certain quantum" of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability.1 72 Procedural unconscionability was the presence of

167. Subsection (c) is the same as current § 2A-108(2). U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) (1999).
168. U.C.C. § 2-105 (Revision Draft June 28, 1999), available at httpJ/www.law.upenn.edu/bIIulc/ucc2
ucc299am.htm.
169. See U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 3 (Revision Draft June 28, 1999) (mentioning both motions).
170. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 2 (Revision Draft June 28, 1999), availableat http://www.law.upenn.edu/bl/ulc/
ucc2/ucc299am.htm.
171. See id. ("The concept integrates elements beyond the traditional defenses of fraud, mistake and duress
into a broader test for enforceability.").
172. Id. (citing NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d769 (Ga. 1996) and American Software, Inc. v.ALL,
54 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. App. 1996)).
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unfair surprise or oppression.' Substantive unconscionability was signaled by a
contract term that was not commercially reasonable. Subsection (a) would apply
only to "commercial contracts and to consumer contracts not covered by (b) and
(c).... "17

As for consumer contracts under subsection (b), the drafters specifically
permitted-and somewhat defined-relief in the absence of procedural
unconscionability. It would not be necessary to show unfair surprise if the contract
term met one of subsection (b)'s three tests: elimination of essential purpose;
conflict with other expressly agreed-upon material terms; or the imposition of
manifestly unreasonable risk or cost. The drafters provided three illustrations
17
demonstrating the tests: a ladder purchase for failure of essential purpose, a
restrictive return policy that conflicts with the salesperson's direct statement for the
second test,17 6 and a77restrictive choice-of-forum clause to demonstrate a manifestly
unreasonable cost.
collection. 78
Subsection (c) presented relief for unconscionable inducement or
The drafters intended to give the courts "limited power to police against 'hide the
terms' tactics, whether pursued before or after the sale" and to induce "sellers to
disclose rather than to hide terms that, while not substantively unconscionable,
impair the buyer's reasonable expectations. ' " This controversial provision

173. The drafters cited a number of relevant factors for assessing procedural unconscionability, assuming
that the buyer has objectively assented to the contract. These included "(1) Age, education, and intelligence; (2)
Business acumen and experience; (3) Relative bargaining power; (4) Who drafted the contract; (5) Whether the
terms were explained to the weaker party; (6) Whether alternations ofa term were permitted; and (7) Whether there
were alternative sources of supply." Id. (citing Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Services, Inc., 907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995)).
174. Id.
175. The elimination of essential purpose illustration was as follows:
Consumer buys a ladder described as a "10' ladder" with 12 rungs. Consumer later discovers
a term in the standard form that states: 'Warning, do not stand on any of the top six rungs." This
is far more restrictive than the usual warning not to stand on the top rung. If the restrictive label,
a non-negotiated term, eliminates the essential purpose of the contract to sell and buy a 10 foot
ladder, it is not enforceable. As such, the ladder probably does not conform to the representation
that it was a "10 foot ladder."
U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 3, illus. I (Revision Draft June 28, 1999).
176. This second illustration was:
Consumer buys a coat for his son, who is not along. He is assured by the sales person that the
coat can be exchanged within 10 days if it does not fit. The standard form sales slip, however,
provides that "all sales are final." The coat does not fit. Assuming that the parol evidence rule
is inapplicable, the non-negotiated term is not enforceable because it conflicts [with] the sales
person's representation, a material term to which the parties have expressly agreed.
U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 3, illus. 2 (Revision Draft June 28, 1999).
177. The final illustration, which demonstrates "manifestly unreasonable cost," was,
Consumer in California buys a new stove and in the standard form covering the purchase there
is a non-negotiated term requiring that any litigation regarding defects in the stove must be
litigated in Georgia, the location of the seller's home office. If this imposes a manifestly
unreasonable cost in the circumstances, the term is not enforceable.
U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 3, illus. 3 (Revision Draft June 28, 1999).
178. Subsection (c) was taken from Section 2A-108(2). See U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 3 (Revision Draft June 28,
1999) (describing the subsection's origin and purposes).
179. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 3 (Revision Draft June 28, 1999). Examples of such clauses included advertising
a watch as "moisture resistant," then disclosing in the box that the product is resistant only "to 50 mm." Id.
(providing illustrations involving a fire extinguisher that cannot be used on kitchen fires and computer software
that required annual upgrading).
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'' °
addressed a "particularized application of procedural unconscionability. 11
This suggested format for unconscionability, which was considered by NCCUSL
at its 1999 annual meeting, drew considerable fire.' 8 ' Critics regarded Sections 2105(b) and (c) as too ambiguous, utterly unnecessary, and at odds with current
law.'8 2 The drafters, on the other hand, viewed Section 2-105's changes as arguably
quite modest.' Although the ALI had approved this formulation, NCCUSL did not.

4. The Current Revisions
After NCCUSL declined to vote on the June 1999 draft, opting instead to defer
consideration, the revision process changed gears entirely. The newly reconstituted
conmiittee moved forward, reverting to Article 2's original language and
repositioning the unconscionability section from Section 2-105 to Section 2-302.
Once again using Section 2-302 for the unconscionability doctrine, the current
drafting committee has made only one minor language adjustment, changing the
word "clause" to "term":
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(b) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any term
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.'"

180. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 3 (Revision Draft June 28, 1999).
181. See Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 144 n.74 (quoting Letter from Clark R. Silcox, National
Electrical Manufacturers Association, to theALI(May 14, 1998) (complaining that "[n]ojustification has everbeen
demonstrated for an expansion of the law in this manner")).
182. See Motion, Joel Rothstein Wolfson to the ALl (May 13, 1999), availableathttp://207.103.196.3/al
1999%5Fwolfson.htm; Motion, James J. White to the ALI (May 13, 1999), available at http://ali.org/ali/
1999_White I.htm; Motion, William A. Worthington to the ALI (May 14, 1999), availableat http:n/207.103.196.3/
alFi1999%5Fworthington.htm.
183. Two commentators, frustrated by the commercial community's continued resistance, described the
changes that would have resulted under Section 2-105:
As approved by the ALL Section 2-105 is a quite modest change in the law governing standardform contracts. It elaborates ever so slightly on the concepts of oppression and surprise that
underlie unconscionability. Though it is possible that a consumer may be aware of a fine-print
provision in a standard form, it is highly unlikely. Therefore, the category of surprise may
encompass any provision that is adverse to the consumer's understanding of the deal, as well
as any provision that is inconsistent with the consumer's assumptions concerning remedies and
enforcement of the parties' obligations. This surprise alone may be enough to render the
provision unenforceable under Section 2-105(b) if the fine print conflicts with the express
agreement. In that situation subsection (b)(2) declares that the fine print is not enforceable....
If the standard form does not conflict with the parties' express agreement, surprise is not
enough under Section 2-105 to render the terms in the form unenforceable. In the absence of
conflict between the form and the express agreement, a requirement of oppression, i.e.,
substantive unconscionability, remains. Subsection (b) elaborates on this requirement....
The innovation of subsection (b) is to foreclose the argument that the court must also find
procedural unconscionability.
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 146-47.
184. U.C.C. § 2-302 (Revision Draft Mar. 2000).
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The basic technical change from "clauses" to "terms" resulted from the drafters'
desire to incorporate the word "term," which Article 2 defines, instead of the word
5
"clause," which is more vague and less meaningful.
Although Section 2-302's text remains substantively unchanged, the drafting
committee has presented new comments to supplement the section. In essence, the
proposed comments shuffle around some of the old language, but do make some
additional points. The changed material centers essentially on the question of
whether the unconscionability doctrine demands a finding of both procedural and
substantive components. On the one hand, the new comments are cautionary,
warning that
a court ought not, on the basis of substantive unconscionability alone, refuse to
enforce a term disclaiming an implied warranty that complies with the
requirements of Section 2-316 or a term that provides for a remedy that is
expressly agreed to be exclusive under Section 2-719 (as long as that term
provides a minimum adequate remedy).'86
The drafters similarly urge that unconscionability "generally" requires that a
7
court find both "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability.'
On the other hand, the comments do acknowledge that, in an appropriate case,
a court might invoke procedural unconscionability alone to negate a term or
contract, although doing so in the absence of substantive unconscionability should
be only a seldom occurrence.' Still, seldom is not never, and the proposed
comments leave the door open to recovery for oppression in the absence of
substantive unconscionability.' 9
As for substantive unconscionability providing an independent basis for relief,
the current revisions certainly do not preclude that possibility. First, the drafters
indicate that both procedural and substantive elements are "generally" required but
not demanded. In addition, the drafters inserted the recent case of Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., which illustrates the section's application in the context of
substantive unconscionability alone.' 9 The Brower case involved an arbitration
term that the court deemed substantively unconscionable regardless of the
185. This was not intended in any respect as a substantive change. Instead, the drafters merely intended to
make Section 2-302 conform with NCCUSL's style rules.
186. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. I (Revision Draft Mar. 2000).
187. Id.
188. The drafters explained,
Accordingly, courts also should seldom invalidate a contract, or a term of a contract, that is not
substantively unconscionable and that merely allocates risk, even disproportionally [sic], or that
otherwise significantly cuts against the complaining party, on the basis of the other party's
conduct standing alone. Unconscionabilityis not intended to allow disturbance ofallocation
of risks because ofsuperior bargaining power, and in those cases that call out for relief often
the conduct will constitute an invalidating cause, such asfraud or duress.;
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. I (Revision Draft Mar. 2000) (italicized language appears in current Section 2-302).
189. The drafters stated that such an approach would be consistent with the provisions of Section 2A-108(2)
and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.108, providing the example of a court invalidating a contract because
of high-pressure sales tactics used in selling a home to a consumer buyer. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (Revision
Draft Mar. 2000) (describing the application of Section 2-302(a)).
190. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y .App. Div. 1998).
191. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. I (Revision Draft Mar. 2000) (presenting "but a small number of the cases decided
prior to the Code and after its enactment").
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consumer's awareness." 9 The offending clause, which the court determined to be
substantively unconscionable, required arbitration in Chicago pursuant to rules
mandating a $4,000 advance fee, of which $2,000 was nonrefundable even if the
claimant prevailed.193
Revisions continue to be made. At this point it is unclear when the Article 2
revisions will be finalized, but they will likely present only technical changes to the
commercial world. 1"
I. SOLVING THE UNCONSCIONABIL1TY PUZZLE
A. Defining the Problem
The threshold determination is whether a problem exists. If Section 2-302's
original language works, then changes are not necessary. After all, "if it ain't broke,
don't fix it."' 95 Unless the unconscionability section is inadequate to address
existing policy issues and public needs, then the revisers should wisely leave well
enough alone. Conversely, if the doctrine is substantively ineffectual, putting a face
to that problem is the logical first step.
In order to determine Section 2-302's effectiveness, it is essential to assess the
doctrine's underlying purpose. Unconscionability became part of the UCC largely
because of a need to police unfair bargains. This mechanism would enable courts
to invalidate grossly one-sided contracts without resorting to "covert tools."'" In
essence, the unconscionability doctrine provides a safety net, one that voids
contracts not quite meeting the more rigid requirements of other policing devices
such as duress and misrepresentation.
To what extent has Section 2-302 successfully accomplished this purpose by
effectively policing unfair bargains? Although the commentary is mixed, most is
negative, and the volume of discontent alone signals a desire for change-for
improvement.9 The most common criticisms stem from the amorphous nature of
the doctrine and the drafters' unwillingness to provide a UCC definition. On the
other hand, this lack of precision was apparently by design, and some regard it as

192. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573-74.
193. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.

194. Later revisions to Section 2-302 have eliminated the proposed comments discussed above, suggesting
instead a new "Preliminary Comment" for NCCUSL's consideration in Aug. 2001. This version is quite similar
to Section 2-302's current comment section except that it omits all specific references to case authority and
includes the statement that "[c]ourts have been particularly vigilant when the contract at issue is set forth in a
standard form." See U.C.C. § 2-302 preliminary cmt. (Draft for Approval at Annual Meeting of NCCUSL Aug.
10-17, 2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bllulc/ucc2/ucc06l2.htm.
195. As the drafting committee headed through the Article 2 revision process, one commentator complained
that "Article 2 is not broke," saying,
As a whole, Article 2 is not broke-I know no one who thinks it is. After a little use, all codes
reveal a few unfortunate turns of phrase, structural inconsistencies, overly idealistic
assumptions, and gaps that cannot reasonably be closed by the statutory language. Blemishes
of that sort neverjustify revision--because similar problems inevitably show up in the revisions
themselves not long after enactment.
Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 COLtUM. L. REv. 1343, 1350 (1997) (also saying that revisions are especially notjustified
"in the law of obligations, which is not as susceptible to obsolescence").
196. See supra note 26-27 and accompanying text.
197. See supra Part I(B)(2).
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a great source of strength, allowing for judicial discretion. In addition, many
amorphous legal concepts flourish despite their inherently uncertain application.
Thus, although any doctrine can benefit from enhanced directives regarding its
function and use, the unconscionability section's formlessness is not fatal, and the
courts have provided helpful structure where the UCC text has not.
Another argument supporting the need to revise Section 2-302-and apparently
one reason driving the drafting committee-was the dearth of authority applying the
section as a basis for relief.'98 It was assumed that an effective unconscionability
section would necessarily be more pervasive. The relative inactivity, the committee
contended, resulted from the doctrine's impractical nature, given the minor dollar
amounts usually advanced in consumer claims. After all, what would motivate such
small suits when the section failed to include any allowance for punitive damages
or attorney's fees and was difficult to litigate?
Although this concern is understandable, the lack of Section 2-302 case authority
may be explainable on other grounds. For one thing, unconscionability is not crafted
to be the primary tool for avoiding contract enforcement; rather, it is the safety net
to catch those cases falling outside other mechanisms. As a result, it should
naturally appear as a back-up choice, not the principal claim, in contract actions.
Courts also construe the doctrine as one that should apply with caution only in
extraordinary circumstances." 9 In addition, businesses would likely be reluctant to
generate case authority finding oft-used standard contract terms unconscionable,
preferring instead to settle or otherwise dispose of the matter. Given the absence of
hard statistical data to establish in any meaningful fashion whether the authority of
the existing Section 2-302 is inappropriately low, it is difficult to premise a
compelling argument for revision on this ground.
much
Despite the unconscionability doctrine's flawed nature, it has already done
2' Judicial
power.
bargaining
of
inequalities
systemic
egregious
most
the
to correct
trends since Section 2-302's enactment have also strengthened the doctrine,
broadening its application. 2" On balance, the law is better with the UCC's
unconscionability doctrine than without it, and the benefits would certainly not be
eliminated by a thoughtful reexamination.
In the end, Article 2 was going to undergo revisions because of necessary
technical adjustments, if not for major substantive changes. Assuming that Section
2-302 shows room for improvement, defining the problems requiring change is
extremely difficult. There are almost as many views as there are business law
basis for revision because
commentators. Some suggest that there is no meaningful
2 2
of an absence of reliable, objective empirical data. ' From the drafting committee's

198. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[Rlescission of a
contract for unconscionability is an extraordinary remedy.").
200. See, e.g., SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 32-34 ("Although many one-sided consumer contracts are still in
use, and virtually all consumer contracts are still one-sided in certain respects, the truly egregious cases are by now
over two decades old.").
201. See supra Part l(B)(I)(b)-(c).
202. As two business law commentators recently stated,
[Tihe disagreement about whether the unconscionability concept provides enough protection
for consumers would benefit from empirical research. Consumer advocates argue that cases are
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perspective, however, there were at least three areas worthy of further examination:
consumer protection, the classic procedural/substantive dichotomy, and the time
frame for evaluating unconscionability-whether contract inducement and
enforcement should be relevant inquiries." Section 2-302 leaves open many
additional questions concerning the doctrine's meaning and application,' and the
drafting committee has had the unenviable task of wrestling with the appropriate
balance.
B. Consumers: Handle with Care?
From the beginning, consumer protection was a focus of Article 2. When Karl
Llewellyn first pieced together the UCC half a century ago, he believed that
consumers should receive heightened protections over other contracting parties. 2'
Although his efforts were largely unsuccessful, Article 2 has always imposed
certain special standards on merchants.'t ° In doing so, the UCC has deviated from
the common law tradition, which formulated generalized contract rules that applied
equally to all parties.2 8 Thus, any Article 2 revisions that enhance different
treatment for consumers and businesses would widen the gulf between UCC and
common law contract approaches.' 9

not an adequate representation of the overreaching that goes on in forms given the cost of
litigation, the relatively small dollar amounts involved, and the uncertainty of what constitutes
unconscionable terms. Industry advocates argue that the absence of cases and the occasional
successful challenge to a term is evidence that the standard is working just fine. The absence
of reliable and objective empirical research on the issue stymies attempts to reach a workable
solution as neither side acknowledges the validity of the other side's world view.
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 144.
203. See supra note 141.

204. The significant inquiries include the following:
Presumably, extensive comments to the draft version of unconscionability will address
numerous questions such as: is there merit in the "substantive"/"procedural" dichotomy
suggested by some courts and writers? What about "apparent" versus "genuine" assent, or
"unexpected" versus "no choice" forms of unconscionability? What about a "contract of
adhesion?" Should the principles of famous cases such as Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. or Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. be codified as reliable guides? What about
the application of unconscionability in cases involving merchants, which courts have studiously
rejected except for those "merchants" who demonstrate the contractual understanding of
consumers? What about the use of unconscionability in cases where the buyer claims a gross
disproportion between price and value with an allegation of over-reaching? Extensive comments
explicating myriad applications of the unconscionability standard are not only desirable but
necessary. Yet, a general statement of the basic elements of unconscionability in the section,
aided by such comments, may be even more desirable, notwithstanding the formidable challenge
such an effort would entail.
John E. Murray, Jr., The Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 533, 542 (1997).

205. See, e.g., Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 116-21 (describing the historical tension between the
treatment of consumer and commercial transactions in the UCC).
206. Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Liewellyn andthe MerchantRules, 100 HARv.
L REV. 465,481 (1987).
207. One is a "merchant" if one is a "person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction."
U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1999). For more specific information on the development of the UCC's merchant rules, see
Wiseman, supranote 206.
208. See FARNswoRTH,supranote 1,§ 1.10, at 37 (noting that"special rules for merchants remained foreign
to the American lawyer until the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code").
209. See SLAWSON, supranote 2, at 6 (saying that the differences [between the UCC and common law] are
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In order to assess what special contract protections might be necessary in the
modern contract context, one should first consider the precise definition of
"consumer." The general definition is simply one who consumes, whether person
or thing. ° Under the UCC, however, the meaning has quite different overtones,
21
implicating both the nature of the party and the end use of the good. ' The present
Article 2 draft states that a consumer contract necessarily involves an individual
buying an item from a merchant, primarily for personal use.2 2 Ultimately, one must
consider what impact a business's presumed sophistication and a good's end use
should have on the unconscionability doctrine's application.
In the context of leases, Article 2A's unconscionability provision contains all of
Section 2-302's protections and more for consumers.2 13 In fact, Section 2A- 108 was

sure to widen, because different institutions make the laws).
210. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) OFTHE ENGUSH LANGUAGE 437 (2d ed. 1987). One
business law commentator recently similarly described "consumer," using the concept broadly so that it might
encompass both individuals and businesses:
"Consumer" shall mean a person who buys a product in order to consume it. This is not the
sense in which the term is commonly used, which includes just individuals who consume for
personal purposes. In the sense in which I will use the term, even large business organizations
can be consumers... .To take a specific example, an automobile-manufacturing company would
normally purchase steel for use in manufacturing processes. It might buy automobile tires from
a tire manufacturer for installation on its vehicles. It would buy electricity, telephone service,
and water for a variety of uses. It would buy word processors and paper for office use and
coffeemaking equipment, paper cups, and napkins for the comfort and convenience of its
employees. Trhus, it would be a "consumer" of these products.
SLAWSON, supranote 2, at 24.
211. The current Article 2 does not define "consumer," but does describe "consumer goods" by crossreference to Section 9-109, which states that consumer goods "are used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family or household purposes." See U.C.C. § 2-103(3) (1999) (providing the cr6ss-reference). The March 2000
draft includes definitions for both "consumer" and "consumer contract," stating that the former is "an individual
that buys or contracts to buy goods that, at the time of contracting, are intended by the individual to be used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." U.C.C. § 2-103(a)(8) (Revision Draft Mar. 2000). A
"consumer contract" is a contract between a merchant seller and a consumer. U.C.C. § 2-103(a)(9) (Revision Draft
Mar. 2000).
212. See U.C.C. § 2-103(a)(8)-(9) (Revision Draft Mar. 2000) (defining "consumer" and "consumer
contract"). The Article 2A revisions similarly describe "consumer" and "consumer lease." See U.C.C. § 2A103(a)(6)-(7) (Revision Draft Mar. 2000) (defining the terms).
213. Section 2A-108 provides,
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a lease contract or any clause of a lease contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the lease contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of law finds that a lease
contract or any clause of a lease contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct or that
unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a lease contract,
the court may grant appropriate relief.
(3) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (1) or (2), the court, on
its own motion or that of a party, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the lease contract or clause thereof, or of the
conduct.
(4) In an action in which the lessee claims unconscionability with respect to a consumer
lease:
(a) If the court finds unconscionabitity under subsection (1) or (2), the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to the lessee.
(b) If the court does not find unconscionability and the lessee claiming unconscionability
has brought or maintained an action he [or she] knew to be groundless, the court shall award
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the drafting committee's initial choice when revising Section 2-302, but that model
was quickly discarded as too controversial.114 In addition to the classic Section 2302 language, Section 2A-108 also extends protection to consumer lease
inducement and enforcement, 215 as well as providing for attorney's fees or other
relief in the appropriate consumer lease action. Although this more expansive
unconscionability treatment has apparently worked well under Article 2A, 2 6
business interests vigorously opposed this approach for Article 2. The practical
arguments for distinguishing between the two frameworks are unclear.
Almost without exception," 7 later Article 2 drafts augmented Section 2-302's
original language with special consumer protection provisions. These approaches
included attempting to define relief for consumers when adhesion contracts impose
unreasonable terms or when substantive unconscionability makes procedural
unfairness entirely unnecessary, as well as awarding appropriate relief for the
unconscionable inducement and enforcement of consumer contracts and attorney's
fees in appropriate consumer contract actions.
Assuming that the unconscionability doctrine should reach farther or at least
achieve better definition, the revision drafters have decidedly opted to favor
consumers over other contracting parties. That treatment certainly comports with
Article 2A's approach to unconscionability in lease transactions, but may not make
sense in the larger context, depending upon how the unfairness problem is presented
and analyzed.
Although unfair agreements present themselves in many ways and in many
frameworks, the use of standard-form contracts provides the classic dilemma.
Contracts today are overwhelmingly standardized,"' regardless of whether they

reasonable attorney's fees to the party against whom the claim is made.
(c) In determining attorney's fees, the amount of the recovery on behalf of the claimant under
subsections (1) and (2) is not controlling.
U.C.C. § 2A- 108 (1999). This language came from § 2-302 and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.108, 7A
U.L.A. 167-69 (1974). U.C.C. § 2A-108 cmt. (describing the uniform statutory sources). The revised Article 2A
has retained the same substantive content. See U.C.C. § 2A-108 (Revision Draft Mar. 2000) (reflectingonly minor
technical adjustments).
214. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
215. The purpose for this language was
[t]hus subsection (2) recognizes that a consumer lease or a clause in a consumer lease may not
itself be unconscionable but that the agreement would never have been entered into if
unconscionable means had not been employed to induce the consumer to agree. To make a
statement to induce the consumer to lease the goods, in the expectation of invoking an
integration clause in the lease to exclude the statement's admissibility in a subsequent dispute,
may be unconscionable. Subsection (2) also provides a consumer remedy for unconscionable
conduct, such as using or threatening to use force or violence, in the collection of a claim arising
from a lease contract. These provisions are not exclusive. The remedies of this section are in
addition to remedies otherwise available for the same conduct under other law, for example, an
action in tort for abusive debt collection or under another statute of this State for such conduct.
U.C.C. § 2A-108 cmt. (1999).
216. See U.C.C. § 2A-108 reporter's note (Revision Draft Mar. 2000) (commenting that there is no need to
conform Section 2A-108 to Section 2-302 since Section 2A-108's operation had not been problematic).
217. The two approaches not confined to consumer protection were the drafts prohibiting unconscionability
during the inducement phase for any contract and suggesting that the section be repositioned in part 1. See supra
note 150 and accompanying text.
218. See SLAWSON, supra note 2,at 30 (describing the prevalence of standardized contracts); I ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PRI.LO,CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4, at 13 (rev. ed. 1993) ("much of modern
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appear to be,2 9 making the term "adhesion contract" a routine concept in contract

2 °
law. Although the efficiency benefits flowing from standardization are great," the
2 ' Consumers see no reason to review them,2 2 and
disadvantages are undeniable.
the sellers themselves often neglect to read standard forms. 2' Certain industries
have even dispensed with the formality of presenting the full contract to the
consumer before executing the deal. 24 Under the circumstances, the quality of
assent is understandably at issue .2z' The standardized contracts problem has been
the endless source of scholarly inquiry. 2 6 The discussion, however, is truly

business is done on terms dictated by one contracting party to another who has no voice in its formulation");
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 4, at 115 ("the use of standard-form documents pervades commercial transactions
and is almost universal in consumer transactions"); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom ofContract,43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943) ("The development of large scale enterprise with
its mass production and mass distribution made [the standardized mass contract] inevitable.").
219. Even contracts that appear to be specially tailored are usually cut-and-paste forms. See SLAWsON, supra
note 2, at 30 (concluding that forms appearing to be "individually crafted" almost never are).
220. One commentator characterized these savings as follows:
When businesses become large enough to engage in numerous transactions of a kind, they can
reduce their transaction costs by making their contracts in standard form. Businesses incur the
costs of drafting a standard contract only once and spread them over as many transactions as
they use the contracts. Standard contracts also make a business's legal risks more manageable
by making them more uniform, also effecting a cost saving... .ln fact, the savings effected by
standardizing contracts are so great that when for some reason a business cannot realize them,
the business is likely not to use contracts at all.
SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 30; see also CORB N &PERD.tLO, supra note 218, § 1.4, at 15 (noting that adhesion
contracts "are essential to the functioning of the economy"). Other benefits flowing from standard forms include
the drafter's ability to control remedies, enforcement mechanisms, and its sales personnel. See Greenfield & Rusch,
supra note 4, at 115-16 (listing four long-recognized benefits); see also Goodwin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 970
F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (describing adhesion contracts as "part of the fabric of our society" despite
the potential for abuse).
221. The disadvantages essentially flow from the perceived imbalance between buyer and seller. This
imbalance can be the result of unfair surprise (as when the buyer is unaware of, or does not understand, a particular
provision) or the absence of options (as when the buyer sees and understands the arguably unfair contract clause,
but has no reasonable alternative). See, e.g., MURRAY, supranote 19, § 97, at 502-03 (describing the "plethora of
problems associated with the use of standard forms").
222. See SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 30 ("There is no reason to read [standard contracts] if [the consumers]
cannot change them, if they probably would not understand them, or if they are unlikely to discover anything in
them that would persuade them to buy the product from another producer."); CORBIN &PERIt.LO, supra note 218,
§ 1.4, at 14 (noting that reading the provisions would be "rather pointless"). Even if the documents are read, they
may be impossible to understand. See MURRAY, supranote 19, § 96, at 484 ("[Elven for the rare buyer who does
read [the fine print provisions], there is more than considerable doubt that he understands what he read.").
223. See SLAWSON, supranote 2, at 31 ("For example, I have never met an insurance or mortgage salesperson
who read the insurance policies or the mortgages.").
224. One commentator described this practice in the following fashion:
Consumers so regularly fail to read standard contracts that in industries with especially long and
complicated contracts, producers often dispense even with the formality of showing the contract
to the consumer and having him or her sign it. They ask the consumer instead to sign a short and
simple "order" or "agreement" that incorporates the contract by reference. The practice in the
insurance industry for years has been to send a person the insurance policy some weeks after he
has purchased the insurance. Before purchasing their insurance, buyers typically see only a onepage form on which they check the blanks to indicate the coverage amounts, exemptions, and
additional coverages they want.
Id. (noting that the mortgage, real estate, and healthcare industries typically operate similarly as well).
225. The issue of assent in standard-form contracts dates back to at least 1917. See Nathan Isaacs, The
Standardizingof Contracts,27 YALE L.J. 34, 39-40 (1917) (describing the assent problem).
226. See ROBERT E.ScoTr & DOUGLAS L LESLIE, CONTRACr LAW & THEORY 509 (2d ed. 1993) (noting
that legal scholars have widely debated this issue).
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academic. Since such contracts are a commercial fact of life, commentators cannot
realistically argue for the elimination of standardized agreements. 27
Given the difficulties presented by the pervasive standard-form agreement, one
must consider whether individual consumers deserve special treatment to the
exclusion of nonconsumers. The principal underlying tension appears universal; it
is between freedom of contract and the plain fact that the modem contracting
process often lacks meaningful choice:
[T]he paradigm of the consumer buyer who is aware of material, risk-shifting
provisions over which he has no bargaining power is extremely rare. The sad
reality is that the typical consumer does not have the foggiest notion of such
provisions but signs what the salesperson refers to as the "standard form"
though the salesperson is equally ignorant of the import of the boilerplate
provisions. This reality raises the confrontation between the requirement that
one must be bound by what he signs, whether or not he reads or understands it,
to insure the stability of contracts, and the reality that innumerable consumer
buyers (and, if the truth be known, merchant buyers, as well) are apparently
assenting to the deprivation of fundamental protection by unwittingly signing
documents containing clauses disclaiming basic warranties and excluding
fundamental remedies." 8
Certainly, merchant buyers and individual consumers are both providing "assent"
without appreciating the full agreement; both are victims under this regime.
Even if the relevant terms are reviewed, the drafter enjoys a superior position that
may unfairly exploit the weaker party.229 To the extent freedom of contract
presupposes equal bargaining power, the contracting parties' relative fortunes
become significant. Of course, most contracting did not occur on a truly level
playing field even in the 1800s.0 Today, however, the unevenness has arguably
become exacerbated. Modem contracting occurs almost entirely between verticallyrelated parties, and vertical contracts inherently give the higher party the superior
bargaining power."
As a matter of principle, special consumer protection should not supplant unified
treatment for consumer and commercial transactions absent a compelling reason for

227. See CORBIN & PERII.o, supra note 218, § 1.4, at 14 (noting that challenging standardized contracts
have become part of our society's fabric, the author concludes that legal scholars should analyze and study such
contracts rather than praising or denouncing them).
228. MURRAY, supra note 19, § 96, at 484-85 (footnote omitted).
229. See, e.g., CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 218, § 1.4, at 14 (noting that such contracts minimize the
realization of the adhering party's reasonable expectations); SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 30 ("The standard contract
enables the producer to take maximum advantage of his superior understanding of the product and the law.").
230. See SLAwsoN, supra note 2, at 31 (noting that the "level playing field" did not really exist even in the

nineteenth century).
231. Professor Slawson describes this trend towards vertical contracting relationships, stating that horizontal
arrangements are relatively unimportant:

Horizontally related persons rarely contract. Two corporations in the same industry will contract
if one acquires the other's assets. Two lawyers will contract to settle a dispute. Two individuals
or two couples will contract if one is buying the other's house. As these examples illustrate,
however, these occasions are exceptional. None is a routine occurrence for the persons
concerned.

Id. The superior bargaining power corresponds to the higher level's technology and can occur regardless of relative
wealth. Id. at 31-32.
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doing so. 232 Under the current regime, no compelling reason is apparent. Although
the UCC as originally crafted did not address consumer problems,233 the traditional
two-pronged analysis for ascertaining unconscionability takes into account the
inherent differences between consumers and merchants by weighing the contracting
parties' relative bargaining positions and sophistication.' Moreover, the trend has
been to permit businesses to take advantage of the unconscionability policing
mechanism, even if such relief is more frequently granted in the consumer context.
Thus, the existing unitary approach operates in a multi-factored environment that
is flexible enough to meet the needs of consumers without exc)uding the practical
issues faced by merchants. The problems associated with vertical contracts exist
throughout contracting. Although individual consumers 235 may, as a general rule,
be more vulnerable in transactions with merchants, even sophisticated parties want
and need protection. 6
C. Dickering over the Procedural/SubstantiveDichotomy
Another basis for reexamining Article 2 is concern over the two-pronged analysis
that has embraced Section 2-302. Commentators have long criticized the breakdown
of unconscionability into procedural and substantive components 23 even though the
courts have generally found the approach workable.
Although many concerns surround the dichotomy's precise application, the main
problem is the extent to which either procedural or substantive unconscionability
alone can support relief. Over time, different courts have appeared to supply their
own, different answers to this question. While many jurisdictions adhere to the
language requiring the presence of both components, the growing trend has been to
employ either a sliding scale analysis or to allow one element to suffice, if the
unfairness was sufficiently strong. 8 Given the split in authority, it might be helpful
to have Article 2 provide more directed guidance.
When the revision drafters faced this dilemma, 9 they examined several different
approaches, each defining the unconscionability analysis only in terms of consumer
contracts. As discussed above, limiting application only to consumers is not sensible
in the larger context. Thus, this evaluation will review the proposed models in terms
of general application.

232. See Fred H. Miller, Consumers and the Code: The Search for the Proper Formula, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
187,210-11 (1997) (stating that "a special consumer provision should not be fashioned unless there is good reason
to believe that a unitary rule for consumer and commercial transactions alike will not be satisfactory").
233. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1,§ 4.29, at 316 (describing the UCC drafter's original intent).
234. See supra notes 50, 56-59, and accompanying text.
235. The unconscionability doctrine obviously does not alone protect consumer rights; many states have
crafted consumer protection laws to provide additional remedies. For a helpful overview of state consumer
protection laws, see Shirley F. Sarna, State Consumer Protection, SD62 ALI-ABA 457 (1999) (reviewing the types
of'Vonsumer Protection Acts" for each state).
236. See SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 32-33 (stating that individual consumers and businesses can both be
victimized by unfair bargaining power and that the long-held assumption that sophisticated businesspeople need
no protection is no longer true).
237. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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The most interesting proposals affecting the procedural/substantive dichotomy
were the May 1998 and June 1999 drafts, which inserted new subsections designed
to relieve the weaker contracting party facing an adhesion contract. Subsection (b)
under the earlier model provided a remedy when the contract presented an unfair,
non-negotiable term only if the weaker party lacked knowledge of the term.
Unfairness was specifically defined as varying unreasonably from the industry
standard or conflicting with the contract's purpose or a negotiated term. No matter
how unfair the term, subsection (b) would provide no relief if there was
knowledge.2 "° Under the NCCUSL annual meeting draft, subsection (b) dispensed
with the knowledge restriction entirely, providing relief when the standard-form
contract's non-negotiated terms eliminated the agreement's essential purpose,
conflicted with other material, expressly agreed-upon terms, or imposed manifestly
unreasonable risk or cost upon the weaker party. 2" Thus, no matter what the weaker
party knew or appreciated, it could be saved from its bargain because this latter
proposal omitted the procedural unconscionability component.
Between the two proposals, the May 1998 approach was the more restrictive and
would have undercut the modern judicial trend. By suggesting that substantive
unfairness could not support relief in an adhesion contract when the weaker party
had knowledge, but lacked meaningful choice, the drafters seemingly stepped back
from recent case authority suggesting that substantive unconscionability alone is
24 2
sufficient. Even though recovery under the old unconscionability analysis may
still have been possible, the creation of an explicit, but more restrictive, recovery
mechanism under the new subsection (b) would give courts reason to pause.
The NCCUSL's 1999 annual meeting draft provided more generous relief under
circumstances that seemed to fairly state current case law as it has been developing.
Regardless of knowledge, certain non-negotiated terms would be too unfair to
survive. Procedural unconscionability would drop out of the equation when
warranted. This language, but for its consumer-specific application, could have
assisted the judicial trend toward recovery under one prong. On the other hand,
since the draft did not clarify the possibility of recovery under procedural
unconscionability alone, the proposal might have unnecessarily restricted recovery
in that regard.
Under either proposal, the definition of non-negotiable and non-negotiated would
have given rise to considerable debate and case construction. Just what is nonnegotiable presumably lies in the stronger party's hands and cannot be ascertained
with certainty unless the weaker party attempted a negotiation. The parameters of
non-negotiated would be larger than for non-negotiable; after all, the parties by
definition could not negotiate non-negotiable terms, but other terms open to
negotiation may not actually be either known or discussed.
The current draft, which essentially reverts to the original Section 2-302
language, may assist the courts with respect to the procedural/substantive
dichotomy. This is because the new suggested comments clarify whether one
240. Of course, recourse could still be had pursuant to subsection (a)-from the original Section 2-302. See
supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
241. See supra Part lI(BX3).
242. Recovery would still be theoretically possible pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-105(a) (Revision Draft May 1998).
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component alone can provide relief, stating that circumstances sometimes require
such a result despite the general rule requiring both elements.u 3 The choice of
illustrative cases similarly demonstrates this bent, including the recent Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., which provided for relief in the absence of procedural
unconscionability. 2' Thus, the current draft with supporting comments tracks the
modem judicial trend. 5
D. Remedies and the Rest
The original Section 2-302, which is essentially the same as the revised Section
2-302, provides that unconscionability's sole remedy is the court's ability to refuse
or limit enforcement so as to negate any unconscionable impact. In earlier draft
revision stages, the section expanded the consumers' remedial options to include
the court's ability to order any appropriate relief 2 " or the award of reasonable
attorney's fees.Ul
The proposal suggesting the allowance of attorney's fees disappeared early in the
revision process. 4 Consumer advocates pressed for this change, arguing that the
allowance of attorney's fees would somewhat offset the litigation advantage a
commercial entity may enjoy over an individual.' 9 Awarding attorney's fees could
also make business less likely to employ standard form contracts containing
unconscionable terms. ° Although comparable language has not been problematic
as part of Article 2A,25' the opposition from business interests was simply too
fierce.
The suggested award of appropriate relief was to be in connection with policing
the inducement or enforcement of consumer contracts. This, too, is already
permitted under Article 2A's unconscionability provision and has not proved
controversial. Since Section 2-302 specifically limits the doctrine's application to
the time of contract execution, the proposal would have expanded the relevant time
frame. As a practical matter, this extension made good sense and provided helpful
definition to the procedural unconscionability component. After all, why should
243. Supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
244. Supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
245. These suggested comments have disappeared since this article's completion in the summer of 2000. See
supra notes 16, 194.
246. Supra notes 149, 167 and accompanying text.
247. Supra note 149 and accompanying text. Article 2A-both the original and the current draft-provides
these remedies.
248. The original draft was patterned after Section 2A-108. Supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
249. One commentator has described this effect in the following fashion:
This type of attorneys fees provision addresses, in small measure, some of the inherent litigation
advantage a commercial entity may have over an individual. A business may have an interest
in prevailing in the particular case which far exceeds the amount of money at stake in that case,
because it has engaged or wishes to engage in the challenged practice with other customers.
Because a large business may have counsel on staff, it may more readily engage in litigation.
An attorneys fees provision for prevailing consumers.. .acts to partially level this tilt in the
playing field.
Gail Hillebrand. The Redrafting of UCC Articles 2 and 9: Model Codes or Model Dinosaurs?, 28 LOY. LA. L.
REV. 191,197 (1994).
250. At least one study has suggested that businesses have not altered their contracting conduct despite the
existence of Section 2-302. See supra note 8.
251. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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unfair process be more defensible simply because it occurs before or after contract
execution? To the extent appropriate relief goes beyond the traditional remedy of
not enforcing the unconscionable clause or contract, this suggested change was too
liberal for commercial representatives to support.
While both remedial proposals have beneficial aspects, it might again make sense
not to limit their application to the consumer context, although the availability of
attorney's fees would likely make the most difference in consumer actions. Still, the
presumption should be against differentiating between contracting parties absent the
most compelling circumstances.
Finally, simple structural changes can sometimes reap surprisingly meaningful
benefits. For example, moving the unconscionability doctrine from Section 2-302
to part 12 would require only minor organizational tinkering, yet would be
beneficial without touching the substantive content. Placing the doctrine in part 1
' much
would present unconscionability as "an underlying and pervasive standard"253
like the good faith requirement. This one revision would be consistent with the
doctrine's goals and would enhance its application in a more subtle, but basic,
fashion.
E. Process, Consensus, and Common Ground
It is far from clear that the 1999 collapse of the NCCUSL annual meeting draft
illustrates a process failure. Given the frustrations surrounding the decision to defer
consideration of Article 2's revisions, as well as the current drafting committee's
determination to revert to the traditional unconscionability doctrine as configured
in the original Section 2-302, one might understandably conclude that business
interests had captured the revision process, forcing the elimination of enhanced
protections for consumers. Even if industry representatives did not ultimately
unduly sway the drafting committee, they may have had a controlling impact on the
NCCUSL leadership at the 1999 annual meeting.254

252.
time. See
253.
254.
way:

During the drafting process, the unconscionability provision resided in Section 2-105 for quite some
supra Part ll(B)(2)-(3).
Murray, supra note 204, at 540 (commending the move to part I as "sensible").
One drafting committee participant described the influence of industry representatives in the following

While interest groups have been very active in the Article 2 revision process, they did not
capture the drafting committee. This failure of capture is perhaps best reflected in the letters that
continued to pour in protesting various items in the revision as the draft proceeded to final
approval at the ALl and NCCUSL in 1999. Whether the industry has captured the leadership
of NCCUSL remains to be seen in light of the leadership's decision at the 1999 NCCUSL
annual meeting to defer the project for yet another year and to reconstitute the drafting
committee, which will presumably be more receptive to industry complaints. Concerns about
enactability had already influenced the July 1999 draft and resulted in compromises in positions
the drafting committee originally maintained... .The drafting committee's ability to deal with
the controversial issues, such as standard-form contracting in consumer contracts, was minimal
due to interest group pressure, in spite of effective representation of consumer interests. The
standard-form contracting issue generated the most comments from participants in the process.
The observers opposing the consumer provisions have repeatedly threatened to stop enactment
in the states if the draft contained the proposed provisions for consumer contracts in standardform situations.
Rusch, supra note 15, at 1689-90.
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Major recurring concerns involve the informational framework and the
participants. It is intuitively difficult to argue for revision lacking the data necessary
to support the need for change and the substantive proposals to replace existing
law."' Similarly, the process stumbles when those most eager to participate are
those having a strong self-interest that may preclude viewing the larger picture.
Even worse, the participants are largely the interest groups' legal representatives.25 6
If an inclusive approach to uniform law revisions is problematic, the better
alternative is not apparent.257 The available information is imperfect, but that will
almost always be true. When rules are formulated as part of a democratic process,
the results reflect the compromise positions among diverse participants. 8 In some
respects, there is a certain inevitability regarding the entire process-the tensions
are predictable, and an outcome that errs on the side of conservative change is not
surprising.259
As for process, criticisms are easy to make, but birthing will always be difficult.
So long as lawmakers value the inclusion of diverse perspectives, hard compromises
will have to be made. When the various representatives aggressively pursue their
causes, locating a common ground for change may not be possible, and that is not
necessarily a problem. After all, if no consensus can be reached, then perhaps no
changes were needed in the first place.

Whether NCCUSL's failure to approve the Article 2 revisions in 1999 was a
mistake is not clear, although the manner in which the events unfolded was
unfortunate.ee Presumably, the competing interests there shared at least one
common goal regarding the unconscionability doctrine--enactability. 26' That is,

255. See supra notes 113,202.
256. See supra note 202 (expressing concerns about having exclusively lawyers at the revision table).
Although this criticism is understandable, it is difficult to imagine that the principals themselves would achieve
better-reasoned results.
257. Rusch, supra note 15, at 1692 (noting that "devising a different process for drafting commercial law
in a democratic society would be extremely difficult").
258. Id. at 1693 (saying that rules flowing from a democratic process "will not be theoretically pure and will
reflect tradeoffs between various positions").
259. One jaded commentator, believing the Article 2 revisions to be a mistake, described his vision of the
drafting process as follows:
For some reason, it gives me pleasure to imagine the colloquy at the annual meeting of the
American Law Institute when the revisions to the Sales Article come up for discussion. It will
all take place in a swank hotel ballroom that comfortably seats three thousand. A couple of
senior members will be recognized at the microphones and will point out, correctly, that a word
has been misused or is ambiguous. They will propose alternative language, and their suggestions
will be gratefully accepted and duly nqted by the Reporter. A few younger members will rise to
point out, again correctly, that the Draft would permit the gougers to take egregious advantage
of consumers in several situations. There will be support for an amendment, but the Reporter
will mention that the idea was considered and rejected in committee, and the amendment will
fail on a voice vote. The revisions will be approved, and The ALl Newsletter will congratulate
all concerned on the progress that has been made in the commercial law.
Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 COLUM. L REv. 1343, 1345 (1997) (noting also that nothing "can alter in any way the
inevitability of this result"). Interestingly, in 1999 the ALl did vote for fairly substantial substantive revisions, but
NCCUSL was the body that turned the revisions back.
260. Even assuming that deferring the vote was a reasonable outcome, waiting to make a surprise
announcement midway through the reading of the revisions was an odd and unseemly twist in a lengthy process
that had always strived for fair accommodation.
261. Regardless ofother disagreements the process participants do agree that uniform enactment is a critical
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after all, the point of uniform laws. The participants, however, differed as to how
they interpreted the consensus necessary for uniform enactment. Although the word
"general
"consensus" can mean "unanimity," it also conveys the sense of
'262 In other
agreement" and "the judgment arrived at by most of those concerned.
words, the presence of strong opposition does not necessarily negate consensus if
there is general agreement as to the entire package. The NCCUSL leaders
themselves said as much when the approval process fell apart in 1999.6
If the natural result of such a process is that uniform law amendments are few
and far between, then that outcome was anticipated fifty years ago by Karl
Llewellyn, the UCC's father. 2' Just because a revision process was initiated does
not mean that revisions-especially substantial, substantive ones-are the likely
result. Despite its shortcomings, the UCC has been a surprisingly durable law that
has served the commercial world very well for generations.
Finally, even assuming that the uniform law revision process is inept-or at least
unnecessarily inefficient-commercial law will not likely suffer. After all, to the
extent that the uniform laws are not precise, are confusing, or otherwise yield unfair
or nonsensical results, specific problems can be redressed when the revised laws
work their way through the various states, and the courts can, to some extent,
remedy any shortfalls by interpretation and supplementation. Somehow, in the great
balance between lawmakers and courts, the competing factions representing
business and consumer interests will ultimately achieve an equilibrium; if not, and
the uniform law's deficiencies are too great, meaningful revisions will eventually
65
occur. Such is the give-and-take of commercial law and business law in general.
CONCLUSION
overkill, Section 2-302 has come full circle.
commentary
and
For all the shouting
has many detractors, it appears that Section
doctrine
Although the unconscionability
unscathed. Controversial at every
process
revisions
2-302 will escape the
marathon-the doctrine and its
drafting
current
the
stage-from inception to
components creating an
substantive
and
procedural
have
both
revision process
be unsurprising
ultimately
should
future
the
Nonetheless,
quandary.
unconscionable
and beneficial.
The fact that the lengthy revision process has been controversial and appears to
be producing rather conservative changes is neither surprising nor troublesome. As
Karl Llewellyn predicted nearly forty years ago, achieving substantive amendments
[Tihere is consensus among the participants in the revision process that the standard [for
completing the UCC revisions] should be the ultimate enactability of the statute in
fundamentally uniform form. The Uniform Commercial Code is simply too important to the

economy of the country and to the perpetuation of the federal system to permit significant
nonuniformity through amendments, or through the failure to enact the revisions....
Miller, supra note 232, at 214-15.

262. WEBSM's NEW COLLEGIATE DICnONARY 238-39 (1979) (providing "group solidarity" as the first

definition, then listing "unanimity" as a synonym and giving the other stated definitions).
263. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (quoting NCCUSL's executive director and its president
following last summer's annual meeting).
264. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

265. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Searalessly into the Twentieth Century,

30 GA. L. REV. (1997) (describing the equilibrium achieved by competing interests in corporate governance).
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would be extraordinarily difficult. Although this inertia gives the UCC a certain
static quality, it does enable the courts to develop the relevant doctrines over time,
especially with respect to an undefined legal concept such as unconscionability.
As for substantive content, the current Section 2-302 adequately serves its
underlying purposes. The revisers initially were concerned that Section 2-302
required retooling because so few reported cases provide relief under it. This lack
of authority is understandable; after all, the doctrine essentially operates as a safety
net catching palpably unfair fact patterns not meeting the standards of other policing
mechanisms. Through the years, the courts have strengthened unconscionability to
expand its reach to individuals and businesses under a flexible application of the
traditional two-pronged analysis.
Under the controversial proposals rejected during the revision process, special
protections for consumers would have distanced UCC treatment from its common
law counterpart and would have unnecessarily disadvantaged non-consumer parties
to the contracting process. In modem vertical transactions, the weaker partieswhether individuals or commercial entities-may need the safety net provided
under Section 2-302. Ironically, although business interests successfully opposed
these changes, in some respects the revisions would have cut back on the courts'
current expansion of unconscionability.
Thus, it appears that the revisions process will yield an unconscionability section
with essentially unchanged text, but with comments clarifying the application of the
procedural/substantive dichotomy. The language does not demand that both prongs
be established for relief, which makes the comments flexible enough to comport
with the current judicial trend. Despite all the fuss, the more things change, the
more they remain the same-and that is not a bad result here.

